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ACTION EA 15

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HICOMRY PASS AMCONUNIT

1. CHARGE HAS RECEIVED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JAPAN JUNIOR CHAMBER COMMERCE JIRO USHIO DESCRIBING PLANS OF JC OFFICERS TO VISIT OKINAWA JUNE 22-25. ACCORDING USHIO'S LETTER, OKINAWA JC'S HAVE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED MEETING AND INSPECTION OF US BASES JUNE 23 AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE MEETING WITH HICOM FOR AFTERNOON SAME DATE. USHIO REQUESTS EMBASSY'S ASSISTANCE IN FACILITATING BASE TOUR AND MEETING WITH HICOM.

2. JC'S ARE WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN TO EMBASSY AND REPRESENT MOST REPUTABLE AND RESPONSIBLE SEGMENTS OF JAPANESE SOCIETY AT JUNIOR EXECUTIVE LEVEL. WE RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF USHIO'S REQUEST AND BELIEVE THAT MEETING OF GROUP WITH HICOM COULD VERY HELPFULLY ACQUAINT AN INFLUENTIAL SEGMENT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WITH US POLICIES IN OKINAWA.

3. EMBASSY PLANS INFORMALLY SUGGEST TO USHIO THAT JUNE 23 MAY NOT BE CONVENIENT DATE FOR BASE TOUR AND MEETING WITH HICOM AND WILL RECOMMEND THAT JC'S SHIFT REQUEST TO ANOTHER DAY.

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ACTION EA-15

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6634
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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SUBJECT: OKINAWA

REF: BANGKOK 6761 AND 6794

1. SEVERAL SEOUL PAPERS CARRIED WITHOUT COMMENT ASAHI JUNE 1 REPORT THAT US BLOCKED ROKG PROPOSAL AT TCC MEETING TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO OKINAWA ISSUE IN COMMUNIQUE. ACCORDING ASAHI, ROKS WANTED TO STATE THEIR CONCERN THAT REVERSION WOULD RESTRICT US USE OF BASES AND WEAKEN US POSTURE IN EAST ASIA. ASAHI REPORTEDLY CITED JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS ITS SOURCE AND SAID MINISTRY CONCERNED ABOUT KOREA'S POSITION, WHICH MIGHT EXERT "SUBTLE INFLUENCE" ON OKINAWA NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ASAHI FURTHER QUOTED AS REPORTING THAT JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPECTS KOREANS TO RAISE OKINAWA ISSUE AT FORTHCOMING ASPAC MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN TOKYO.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER CHOI, IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY OVER ASAHI REPORT AND VOLUNTEERED DENIAL THAT HE HAD PRESSED ON OKINAWA ISSUE AT BANGKOK OR TRIED TO PUT REFERENCE TO PROBLEM IN COMMUNIQUE. BY IMPLICATION, HE ALSO DENIED THAT HE INTENDED BRING UP ISSUE AT ASPAC MEETING.

4. COMMENT: CHOI MAY INTEND AT LEAST TO SOFT-PEDDLE OKINAWA AT ASPAC BECAUSE OF MORE OR LESS CONCURRENT US-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS OVER MATTER, BUT IT PROBABLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO STAY COMPLETELY AWAY FROM SUBJECT.

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46

COMMITTEE FOR JAPAN-U.S. KYOTO CONFERENCE

Gloria Building
3-6-15, Kasumigaseki
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Tel: Tokyo (580) 0641
Cable: COMJUKC, Tokyo

Chairman: *Dr. Nobumoto Ohama*

March 15, 1969

Professor Glenn A. Olds
425 Alden Street,
Springfield, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Olds;

The world situation is still unstable and yet it is very encouraging to know that you are more and more active now in tackling various world problems.

According to the instructions of Dr. Nobumoto Ohama (Chairman of Committee for Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference), I would like to send you, by separate mail, the report prepared, and announced on March 8, by the Okinawa Base Problems Study Committee.

This Study Committee was organized in February last year as a subordinate organ to the Council on Okinawa Problems, an advisory body to Prime Minister Sato. It is composed, as shown in the report, of Japanese influential experts in international politics and security problems.

Since holding its first meeting in February last year, the Committee met 20 times up through March 8, this year, to make joint studies of the reversion of administrative rights in Okinawa and the handling of the U.S. military bases when it is returned to Japan.

Moreover, the Study Committee played a major part in planning to hold the "Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference" at the International Conference Hall in Kyoto from January 28-31, this year. The report to be sent by separate mail has been drawn up, in careful consideration of the results of the Study Committee's deliberations over more than a year as well as those of the Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference.

Since it was made public, the report has produced great repercussions among the people not only of Okinawa but of the Japanese mainland as well, and this fact indicates that they are of high interest in the problems of the reversion of administrative rights in Okinawa and the handling of the military bases. At the same time, I think we should not overlook that the tide of public opinion has been in favor of the report's contention. It is likely, therefore, that the Japanese Government will take this report as a major guideline for the forthcoming Japan-U.S. negotiations on Okinawa problems.

We would greatly appreciate it if you could be kind enough to give us your opinions or comments on this report.

Very truly yours,

I. Suetsugu

Ichiro Suetsugu
Secretary General

IS:hi

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REPORT

prepared by

The OKinawa Base Problems

Study Committee

March 8, 1969

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The Okinawa Base Problems Study Committee was set up informally as a component organ of the Okinawa Problems Consultative Committee for the Prime Minister and has had as its main purpose the study of the question of the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa, with particular emphasis on the treatment of the military bases which would be the central issue in the negotiations with the United States.

The Study Committee is made up of scholars, specialists and experienced persons whose names are given below. Since its first meeting held on February 17, 1968, the Committee has met 20 times as of March 8 this year.

Also, in addition to these regular study meetings, the Committee has organised and held the "Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference" at the International Conference Hall in Kyoto from January 28-31, 1969.

At that conference, members of this Committee formed the nucleus for the Japanese delegation: and nine-top-ranking American scholars, specialists and experienced persons attended, as well as several special participants from Okinawa. The conference lasted for four days and held discussions mainly on the question of Okinawa. The discussions were extremely useful, particularly because a number of valuable suggestions were made by American participants on the questions of the reversion of administrative rights and the treatment of the bases.

As a result of the Study Committee's deliberations over the period of more than a year, and also through the discussions at the Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference, Committee members have been able to obtain better understanding on the question of Okinawa, particularly in the field of studies concerning military bases.

It was against such back ground that this report has been drafted, with the consent of all the Committee members.

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Members

Chairman

KUSUMI Tadao (Member of Okinawa Problems Consultative Committee)

HAYASHI Shuzo (" " ")

WAKAIZUMI Kei (Prof., Kyoto Sangyo University)

KAMIYA Fuji (Prof., Osaka Metropolitan University)

NAKAMURA Kikuo (Prof., Keio University)

NAGAI Yonosuke (Prof., Tokyo Institute of Technology)

KOTANI Hidejiro (Prof., Kyoto Sangyo University)

KOMIYAMA Chiaki (Yomiuri Shimbun, Executive Secretary of the Committee for Research on International Affairs)

KOSAKA Masataka (Asst. Prof., Kyoto University)

ETO Shinkichi (Prof., Tokyo University)

SAEKI Kiichi (Director, Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics)

KISHIDA Junnosuke (Asahi Shimbun, Editorial Board member)

MIYOSHI Osamu (Mainichi Shimbun, Editorial Board member)

SUETSUGU Ichiro (Councillor, Assistance Association for Okinawa, Ogasawara and Northern Islands)

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I. Pinpointing the Problem

A definitive decision by the Governments of Japan and the United States for the reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa will have far-reaching effects on the future political relations between the two nations and also on the national security policies of the respective countries. It can become either a starting line for more dynamic and positive cooperative relations between Japan and the U.S., or a factor which gives rise to mutual distrust and bad feelings, strained relations between the two nations, with harmful effects on the general situation in the Pacific and Asia. The two countries, therefore, should come to realize the seriousness and the urgency of the situation involved in the question of Okinawa, and seek a realistic and reasonable solution in the spirit of mutual understanding and with a good outlook for the future.

With this in mind, we have been studying the form of the military bases following the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa not only from the military angle but also from other angles with due regard to various political aspects. Military problems are, by nature, highly political problems; and it is not realistic to treat them as two separate things. For instance, if a solution which emphasizes the military functions of the bases in Okinawa to such an extent that, the solution as a whole becomes unacceptable to the Japanese people, it cannot be a political solution. It may even bring about a new source of friction between Japan and the United States.

On the other hand, diplomatic negotiations cannot be effectively carried out without taking into account the historical background which brought Okinawa under the U.S. administration, as well as the fact that the military bases in Okinawa have been occupying a important position in the network of multilateral U.S. commitments in Asia.

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In dealing with a problem of national importance, it is necessary to clarify basic policies at home and abroad. Of course, diplomatic negotiations are made possible by adjusting the different positions of the countries concerned. For this reason basic policies must not be left ambiguous.

After having studied the question of the treatment of bases, with all these complex military and political conditions in mind, we have arrived at the conclusions given below. We believe they are not only objective and appropriate from the standpoint of the military-strategic value of the bases in Okinawa but also from the viewpoint of future political relations between Japan and the United States.

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II. Our Conclusions

As a result of our studies, we came to the conclusion that the reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa as well as the treatment of U.S. military bases after the reversion should be handled in accordance with the following basic policies:

(1) An agreement for the enbloc reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa setting the date for reversion should be made within the year 1960 between the Governments of Japan and the United States. It is desirable to set the time of reversion at an earliest possible date. At the latest, the reversion should take place by 1972.

(2) After the reversion of administrative rights, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should be made fully applicable to Okinawa. Therefore, the U.S. military bases in Okinawa should become subject to the Status of Forces Agreement under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and naturally, the provisions concerning the prior consultation stipulated in the Exchange of Notes accompanying the Security Treaty should also become applicable.

(3) Okinawa has an excessive concentration of U.S. military bases, and in many cases they are intermingled, in a complicated manner, with areas occupied by the local populace. Therefore, it is desirable to make adjustment and integration of the U.S. military bases as much as possible before reversion.

After the reversion, Japan will assume primary responsibility for the defense of Okinawa, and take charge of land defense, coastal patrol and local air defense. It is necessary, therefore, to speed up plans for the transfer of bases involved in such functions.

(4) When the agreement is made to revert the administrative rights, a joint Japan-U.S. consultative body should be established in order to facilitate the carrying out of the reversion smoothly.

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III. Summary of Deliberations

The following is the summary of our deliberations on which conclusions were reached.

(1) The Asian situation and the roles of Japan and the United States

(a) With the moves toward an end of the Vietnam War and the advent of a new president, the United States may show some changes in her stance toward foreign affairs. Its general direction will be to limit as much as possible America's one-nation role as policeman of the world, and to ask the free nations to share more of the role and responsibility for the maintenance of peace. In the Asian area, she will try as much as possible to avoid automatically shouldering the defense burden as she did in the Korean War or the Vietnam War, and will seek to strengthen the structure for self-reliance and self-help by the Asian nations. In that case, she will expect Japan to play as major a role as possible, including regional economic cooperation.

The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese People's Republic is approaching the wrap-up stage, but her political situation still has not emerged from the bounds of political instability, and big econimic scars still remain. Rebuilding the party and government control organs that have incurred major blows in this process will still take a number of years. It is conceivable that China's political and econimic instability will restrain any positive actions in her foreign affairs. On the other hand, that suggests that there are possibilities for sudden and unpredictable changes in both her domestic and her foreign policies.

China's development of nuclear weapons may aim chiefly at deterrent power vis-a-vis the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and at the political effects that nuclear arms have; with the tempo of that development having slowed down somewhat of late, China's

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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ability to develop any considerable number of operational ICBM's may be delayed beyond 1975. Her capacity is limited and America will be able to provide herself and the Asian nations with a highly reliable deterrent power against Chinese nuclears for a considerable period of time from now. Furthermore, moves to end the Vietnam War could be an effective factor for easing the tensions in Sino-US relations.

In connection with the above-noted changes in America and the withdrawal of British forces from east of Suez, the Soviet Union may try to expand her influence in Asia. However, Soviet econimic and political interest in the area east of Southeast Asia, except for North Korea and Japan, is not as high as it is toward the Middle East and South Asia, nor do we believe that her military influence will become as strong there as it is in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Her recent build-up of naval power has drawn attention; but we do not think she has the intention or capacity to develop her fighting power in the Pacific or Indian Oceans in a form that would make it a match for America's Seventh Fleet. Rather, attention should be given to its political influence.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula has continued in recent years to be unstable due to the North Korean Government's having made clear its line of armed unification. But we feel that both the US and USSR tend to agree on considering this area a zone for the balancing of power between east and west, instead of as a place for expanding their power. It seems that China, too, is receptive, though to a different degree, to the same idea. Consequently, so long as prudent handling by the US, USSR and China continues, the possibility of minor clashes in this area expanding into large-scale local warfare is felt to be extremely slight.

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Japan lacks the military power to exercise any role beyond her own direct defense; but her economy is still continuing its high annual growth rate of around 10%, and she has already become the world's number-three industrial nation. Japan's GNP in about 1975 is predicted to reach a size almost equal to the GNP of all Asia including China.

The above is a general outline of the Asian situation. Of course, looked at in detail, the situation is far more complex and cannot be wrapped up with any single conclusion. Needless to say, the chances for a great number of contradictions do exist.

(b) However, on the matter of Okinawa's reversion, most important among these factors are the changing roles of America and Japan and the future of cooperative relations between the two countries. In America, in the course of ending the Vietnam War, her reconsideration of her strategy and policies toward Asia will proceed in directions such as stated above. Also, with the unfolding of military technology, her policies on military deployment in the Western Pacific could undergo some change. As a natural consequence of developing national power, Japan will seek out a role in Asian and world politics and, reflecting the development of her nationalism, will try to assert her own positions more positively.

Amid such changes, Japan and America have begun to seek a way toward a relationship of a sort of equal cooperation in the Asian area. What has now come up on the schedule is the matter of Okinawa's reversion. In short, the reversion of Okinawa has such importance as to be termed the completion of the changes in Japan-U.S. relations that have gradually evolved from the occupation relationship to a cooperative relationship. Consequently, the matter of Okinawa's reversion must be handled from a viewpoint which is that broad.

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It must be stressed that foreign relations in the nuclear age are not determined entirely by relative military power, but are determined by the overall strength deriving from economic power, political intentions, social stability, and so forth. The militarily bipolar and politically multipolar reality of the world structure constitute reasons for further strengthening the awareness of this. Even in cooperative relationships between nations it is necessary to maximize such overall strength. Much should not be lost in terms of overall strength as a consequence of not weakening the military relationships of one specific period. In short, the matter of Okinawa's reversion must not be treated only from the viewpoint of Far East security in the narrow sense; and, what is more, the question must not be dominated solely by consideration for what is called the preservation of Okinawa's military functions.

For Japan to be able to bring to bear her own overall strength and play a more positive role in Asia, she cannot take over the American role as is, but her own policies and strategy must be asserted and adjustments must be made between the two countries. A basic principle of Japan's foreign policy is to minimize the role of military strength in international politics. It is Japan's basic idea that Asian stability is achievable by planning the internal stabilization of the Asian nations through econimic cooperation and other non-military means rather than through military endeavors; and Japan, in the context of its rapid development of national power, has begun to realize more and more that she can contribute to Asian stability through this policy.

Thus, both Japan and the U.S. have come to have quite a broad range of options on means for achieving Asian stability. While staying aware of these changing conditions and paying heed to their basic interest in further developing

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the relationship between them, the two nations must resolve the matter of Okinawa's reversion.

The solution of this matter is urgently required. For a quarter of a century the people of Okinawa Prefecture have been kept under foreign domination. And coupled with this, huge military bases on Okinawa, is giving rise to grave problems both in economic and in human terms.

It is no longer permissible for the situation to be left as is. Again, the situational changes occurring in Japan, the U.S. and in Asia are extremely rapid and require prompt responses. Vacillation and procrastination would only complicate the problem and make a solution more difficult, and a good chance for a positive solution would be lost.

Fortunately, influential opinion is growing in both Japan and the United States that during 1969 the reversion of Okinawan administrative rights should be agreed on, with reversion to take place during 1972. This opportunity must not be lost.

(2) U.S. military bases and reversion of administrative rights

(a) Okinawa has been called "the keystone of the Pacific" and is said to be the nucleus for American strategy in the Far East area.

It has been explained that in the Okinawa bases all levels of fighting forces are positioned or could be positioned such as could respond to any form of war from nuclear war to guerrilla war, and that the maintaining of such Okinawa bases is indispensable to deter war. That is the basis for asserting the necessity of continuing such functions in handling the reversion of Okinawa.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

As against this, the importance can be emphasized, first, of the two considerations that Asian stability, as stated above, has the nature of not being achievable basically by military efforts alone, and that measures must not be adopted such as would detract from promoting cooperation for the sake of increasing the overall strength for stability.

In addition, even from the military aspect, it must be pointed out that the situation must not be made too inflexible. The base functions are not something whose value cannot be brought out unless they are completely endowed with everything.

The position of the Okinawa bases in America's Far East strategy is not all-powerful or unique and absolute when emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula or the China mainland are considered. In relationship to the bases in Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, Guam and so forth, their strategic value is only relative and supplementary. In comparison to the two big naval ports of Yokosuka and Sasebo, the value of Okinawa as a naval base is quite low. As air bases too, the Okinawa bases can be given weight for their geographic location in relationship to the several air bases in Guam and in Japan proper. For an emergency situation in the Far East, it is the bases in Japan proper that have the greater value for their dispersed positioning and the latent capacity behind them.

Also, it is generally understood that while the American bases in Okinawa and Japan proper will continue to have a great value for mutual defense, changing technology should enable a more or less steady reduction, over time in the U.S. peacetime presence in these areas.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

(b) As to the question of the deployment of nuclear weapons which is the main focus of the issue regarding the conditions of American military bases after the return of Okinawa, it is our conclusion that there is only marginal importance of actual presence of nuclears on Okinawa.

First, changes in the technology of weapons delivery and in techniques of control and logistic support have diminished and will continue to diminish the value of nuclear operations from "close-in" bases.

A decade ago, close-in nuclear bases played a large role in the deterrence of nuclear attack. At a stage when American strategic nuclear attacking powers had a limited retaliatory force quantitively and qualitively, the strategic bomber units and medium-range missiles were deployed at overseas bases to supplement them. This situation has altered drastically. Most of the force is made up of ballistic missiles that can be launched from the continental United States or from ocean areas to distant targets. And the manned bombers which constitute but a slight retaliatory nuclear force have an operational range much greater than before. Overseas bases, even at the time, were open to a much wider variety of attacks with larger payloads and greater accuracies and with much less warning than bases inside the United States. The vulnerability problem, if anything, may have worsened for overseas bases as compared to bases at intercontinental range. For such reasons, the role of overseas bases have played a sharply diminishing role in strategic deterrence.

It has been said that even vulnerable close-in bases would make an important contribution to nuclear deterrence by providing warning of a nuclear attack. It was held that either the overseas bases would be attacked first and so

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provide extra warning to the continental United States, or they would be left untouched and therefore able to retaliate and disrupt an opening enemy salvo. But, studies in the United States have concluded that vulnerable nuclear bases overseas would not be adequate to assure a warning.

For the purpose of deterring nuclear war, then, overseas basing of nuclear vehicles has a sharply reduced importance. In case deterrence fails, it has seemed in the past that nuclear strikes launched from overseas, because they would start from close by, would have an advantage of more quickly spoiling an enemy attack and so limiting the damage an enemy might do to Japan or to the United States. However, this potential function too has declined in importance over time with the great increase in the speed, weight and precision of a nuclear attack from far off. At the same time, the availability of sea-based and other close-in means has greatly diminished the value of the "close-in" Okinawa base.

Secondly, the value of Okinawa as a base for retaining and storing small tactical nuclear weapons or so-called battlefield nuclear weapons is greatly diminishing. In the days when Communist China had not developed strategic nuclear weapons, a strategy would have been possible of countering overwhelmingly superior conventional forces with small tactical nuclears used locally in stages; but hereafter there will be no meaning to normally keeping tactical nuclears at close-in bases no further than 360 nautical miles from the continent for the sake of defending those bases or in readiness against an emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere.

The Vietnam War is showing that the deterrent power of nuclear weapons has no effect in this kind of war. Even if it were necessary to have short-range battlefield

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0452

nuclear weapons, technology has so developed that it is possible to store nuclears on ships without the kind of political problems as might arise in Okinawa. Also, it should be pointed out that transportation has become so fast that the time needed to move weapons to the battle-field has been reduced.

On the whole, it has become widely accepted that, with the development of theories of arms control, it is desirable that, for deterrent effect, the deployment of nuclear weapons be kept as limited as possible. For that reason, it is particularly stressed that nuclear weapons not be located on foreign soil unless the recipient nation has strongly requested it. Such considerations have become one basis for the NPT constituting an urgent matter, with their idea being that nuclear controls by the super-powers not become more complicated than at present.

In this sense, it can be considered to be not only in Japan's interest but also in America's not to place nuclears in Okinawa.

(c) The second focal point for handling of the bases after reversion concerns the problem of the application of the Exchange of Notes under Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applying to use of the bases even for conventional weapons. Our conclusion on this point is as stated at the outset: we judge it to be desirable for both the United States and for Japan that the Okinawa bases receive the same treatment as these in Japan proper. For, we hold that in this case, the added value obtaining from being able to operate without "prior consultation" would be quite limited in comparison to the value of the military actions that are permitted in Japan proper or in comparison to military actions within the same framework of limitations

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Authority NND 969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

on Okinawa. Also, we hold that the value gained would be extremely small as compared to the political loss that could be incurred from having the bases treated differently from those in Japan proper. Instead, we think it is vital to give consideration to not creating factors that would suppress changes in Japan that have began to proceed toward a more positive stance.

When localized, non-nuclear wars break out in the Far East, close-in bases such as in Okinawa play an important role in operations. Also, the fact that these base clusters are always in a completely and effectively ready condition in peacetime and the units stationed there are in shape to be able to take counter-actions immediately are an important element for deterring the outbreak of local wars. In order to give these war-deterrence forces the maximum effectiveness, there must not be even the slightest uneasiness about the reliability that the bases have. But, the added value that they could gain from being kept in a condition where they could be used without "prior consultation" in case of the use of such conventional forces would be extremely limited in the realistic contingencies conceivable henceforth. In the unfortunate event that a war should break out in the Far East, fast operational moves from these bases would be very important. In such instances, it is most likely that the use of military force would be indispensable for both Japan and the United States. Thus, in such a case, it could not be carried out at all without consultation. Moreover, progress in information techniques have made possible the comparatively early discovery of changes in the situation, and rapid developments in communication technology make it possible for the time used technologically for consultations between governments to be drastically shortened, if they are just ready.

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Authority NND 969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0454

One operational move that would require a faster response would be that in case of a surprise attack occurring against a base. However, as soon as the Security Treaty is fully applied after reversion of administrative rights, "actions to meet the common danger" would be taken on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty, in the face of such a situation. I.e., we think that there would be a situation separate from that requiring prior consultation under Article 6.

With her increase in national power, Japan has taken a more positive stance in the politics of the world and Asia. This change should be taken into consideration for such cases, too. It is Japan more than the United States that has a direct interest in Far Eastern security. By giving serious weight to Japan's judgment, America would be able to avoid an over-hasty military response. By Japan's becoming a nation with a greater interest in the stability of the Far East, she would have to be expected to able to cooperate further with America on this point. By trusting and nurturing such changes on the part of Japan, America would be able to see further improvement in the exchange of views between the two countries in time of emergency.

(3) Okinawa's reversion and Japan's security policies

(a) As an island nation close to the continent, Japan has to secure export markets, import markets and trade routes in order to survive and prosper. That shows that it is vitally important for Japan's existence that there be peace and security in the region from the Western Pacific through Southeast Asia.

However, in present circumstances, these areas hold the posibility of conflicts, with the tension between North Korea and the ROK, with the new situation accompanying China's development of nuclear arms, with the instability

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0455

of the Southeast Asian region, with the Soviet Union's emergence onto the seas, and so forth. Needless to say, for Japan to shut herself off with an isolationist stance would be no solution of the problem, in view of her position as an oceanic nation.

Yet, the scope of defense through Japan's military power is to attack and hold out against invading and landing forces, anti-aircraft defense, searching for and destroying submarines in her littoral waters, protection of convoys, guarding and blockade of straits, coastal patrol, etc. Its capacity is quite limited to secure the skies and seas over a broader area. Here, there is a need for the deterrence and dispute-avoidance role which the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the Security Treaty brings. In that sense, the function of the U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan proper must be correctly rated.

For Japan, her own security and the security of the Far East region essentially have a close connection. As Japan grows economically, the more she enlarges the range of her activities, the more that interconnection becomes clear. But, so far she has not been able to cut free completely from a sense of continuing to be under an occupation; and her idea of being isolated from international politics resulted in a rupture between the two.

Of late, that rupture is slowly being cemented over. Reversion of Okinawa in the form discussed above would further stimulate the changes now proceeding in Japan. Along with the further restoration of Japan's confidence and pride, we could expect a rise in her sense of having a role and responsibility in international society.

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(b) In such instance, also, Japan's military capability would still be as limited as under present political conditions. Still, Japanese military expenditures in 1969 exceeded 1.3 billion dollars and would approach 3 billion dollars by 1975 if the present rate of increase continues. Furthermore, contributions to international security in the present age should not rely solely on military power. Instead, they should be in the context of overall power, which depends on high-level technology, big economic power, political and social stability and so on. There will be greater weight attached to Japan's capacity for dispute and crisis management in the fields of economic cooperation with the Asian nations, contributions to UN peacekeeping actions and its independent endeavors for international peace and security.

Of course, the reversion of Okinawa raises the matter of Japan's strengthening her efforts for autonomous defense. In this instance, efforts for autonomous defense do not mean only expanding here military power. Instead, in light of the bipolarized U.S.-Soviet military structure, it is natural, and will be effective for a method of approach separate from that to be taken. However, with the return of Okinawa a build-up of defense power adequate to protect that area will be necessary. The outlook for a build-up of Japan's autonomous defensive power along with her economic development is at the basis of our assertion that the gradual reduction of U.S. forces station in Japan is possible.

What is important in connection with the U.S.-Japan security set-up that it remain always possible for Japan to join with the U.S. on a mutual and equal basis in re-evaluating what is demanded for Japan's own security and for securing Asian peace and security. It is desirable for both Japan and the United States that she (Japan) develop as a responsible

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0457

power. So long as both are independent nations each with its own differing ideas and interests, it is quite natural that many complicated problems involving conflicts between the two nations should arise henceforth. But, it must be the common goal of Japan and the United States to cooperate to the maximum extent possible to achieve an "equal partnership", even while making it clear that both nations have their own national interests and their own assertions based thereon, and while both frankly recognize differences as differences and confirm what they can and cannot do.

We are aware that the reversion of Okinawa offers an important opportunity to move toward achieving that goal.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

IV. Prospects and Topics

This, after all, will have to be given direction so that the solution of the Okinawa problem will become the foundation for making the Japan-U.S. political relationship develop into something even more equal and vigorous. There already exists between Japan and the United States a relationship of common interests that is growing ever closer in economic, technological, cultural and other fields. In the Asian area, both nations have political objectives with aspects that fundamentally coincide. It is, indeed, the concerted action between the two free, strong and independent oceanic nations on both shores of the Pacific that will be the key henceforth to Asian peace and progress. Without the friendly relations between these two nations there can be no stabilization of the overall situation in this area. We believe that the negotiations for Okinawa's reversion should proceed upon such a vision.

At the same time, we must take into account the fact that the return of administrative rights in Okinawa calls for developmental changes in both nations' security policies in the Western Pacific and Far East area, and thus in the cooperative relationships of the two nations under the current security treaty.

First, is the revision that can be foreseen in America's Far East strategy. With the reversion of administrative rights, a change will naturally take place in the political status of the Okinawa bases. When placed under Japanese sovereignty, the Okinawa bases, after all, will not only have to be consolidated and reduced but also it will be difficult to avoid their being placed under greater political limitations on their use than heretofore. Consequently, America's Far East strategy will have to be taken up in the near future for revision or revamping. We believe that the U.S. Government is already proceeding with a reconsideration of its Asian policies and military strategy to cope with the situation "after Vietnam." And, in so doing, it may be giving consideration also

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969000
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0459

to the problems that will naturally come with the above changes in Okinawa's position.

Second, in one respect, that will increase the independent role and responsibilities of Japan under the present Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The strengthening of our nation's autonomy in its foreign and security policies would be a direction hard to avoid in light of the political plurality of the world structure. Also, with the rapid development of military transport technology by sea and air, it is expected that in the 1970's America's main military forces will gradually become concentrated on the U.S. mainland and there will be a corresponding downward trend in dependence on overseas bases. These factors will bring qualitative changes in the global alliance relationships which the U.S. formed in the cold war era. Similarly, it is expected that U.S.-Japan relations under the Security Treaty will be revised in the very near future in the direction of strengthening Japan's autonomy and responsibility.

Of course, the strengthening of Japan's autonomy will, in one respect, strengthen the necessity for political consultations with the U.S. Political consultations can only have real significance and vigor when they are premised on there being two independent policies and strategies. Through political consultations, both Japan and the United States will be able to deepen their mutual understanding and strengthen their system of competition and co-operation. Thus, in the 1970's Japan and the United States will be able to enter into a new and more active relationship of alliance.

Also, it must be noted that problems of national security in the nuclear age area quite complicated and loaded with nuances, making necessary multi-faceted and creative overall strategies. We have noted that the political debates so far on our nation's security problems have tended to be heavily based on legal theories and too lacking in substantive discussion. We believe that there can be no independent, creative security policy, or foreign policy either, where substantive debates do not take place.

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From the above viewpoints, we have concluded that a general and deep-probing re-consideration of our nation's security policies is urgently demanded. The establishment of autonomy in Japan's diplomatic and security policies will, we believe, facilitate the revamping of America's Asian policies and Far East strategy and contribute to smoothing the reversion of administrative rights in Okinawa.

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INFO : HICOMRY; DA (For ODCSOPS Pass ODUSA-IA); OASD (PA); CINCPAC (For POLAD); CINCUSARPAC

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE 11 March 1969

SUBJECT : OKINAWA: Bases Subcommittee Report

REF : Tokyo 1790

There is forwarded as an enclosure to this airgram the full text of the "tentative" translation done by the Bases Subcommittee of the Prime Minister's Advisory Committee on Okinawa and Other Problems of its March 8, 1969 report, "Okinawa Bases and Return of Administrative Rights" (the "Kusumi Report").

The Embassy reported initial reaction to the "Kusumi Report" in the reftel. The report continues to draw considerable press and other comment, which the Embassy will report separately.

Enclosure: 5 cc m.m.

Okinawa Bases and Return of
Administrative Rights
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Okinawa Bases and Return of Administrative Rights

(Tentive Translation)

Report

Prepared by

The Okinawa Base Problems

Study Committee

March 8, 1969

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The Okinawa Base Problems Study Committee was organized unofficially as a part of the Okinawa Problems Consultative Committee and has had as its main purpose the study of the reversion of administrative rights in Okinawa and particularly the handling of the military bases, which appears to be a focal point for negotiations with the United States.

The Study Committee is made up of private scholars, specialists and men of experience, as listed below. Since holding its first meeting on February 17, 1968, the Committee has met 20 times up through March 8 this year.

Also, in addition to these regular study meetings, the Committee held the "Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference" at the International Conference Hall in Kyoto from January 28-31, 1969, as planned by this Study Committee.

At that conference, the members of the Committee formed the nucleus for the Japanese side; and nine top-ranking American scholars, specialists and experienced persons attended, besides several special participants from Okinawa. All met with us for four days of discussions on subjects central to the Okinawa problem. The discussions were extremely meaningful. In particular, we were given many valuable suggestions by the American side concerning the reversion of administrative rights and the handling of the bases.

The results of the Study Committee's deliberations over more than a year and the results of the Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference make us sure that our understanding of the Okinawa problem has been deepened, particularly through our studies on the bases.

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KUSUMI Tadao (Member of Okinawa Problems Consultative Committee)
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I. Pinpointing the Problem

It is expected that the final decision by the Governments of Japan and the United States regarding the return of the administrative rights of Okinawa will have serious repercussions on the mutual relations of the two nations and the national security policies of the respective countries. It can become a starting line for more dynamic and positive cooperative relations between Japan and the U.S., or a major factor to cause tensions between the two nations, mutual mistrust and unfriendly feelings, and eventually to aggravate the general atmosphere in the Pacific and of the Far East situation in general. The two countries, therefore, should have a good perspective of the seriousness and the urgency of the situation involved under the Okinawa issue, and seek a realistic and rational solution with deep mutual understanding and a good sense of the future.

With this in mind, we have been studying the form of the military bases in Okinawa upon reversion of administrative rights, not only from the military angle but also with consideration for various political aspects. A military issue is, by its nature, a highly political issue; and it is not realistic to treat the two as separable. For instance, if a solution emphasizing the military functions of the Okinawa bases more than is necessary were to be hardly acceptable as a whole to the Japanese people, that would not constitute a political solution, but instead might well bring about a source for disputes between Japan and the United States.

At the same time, it should be remembered that there can be no effective diplomatic negotiations if the historical background for Okinawa having come under the American administration, or the important strategic position the Okinawa bases have played in the multiplex net of American commitments in the Far East are ignored.

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In tackling a problem of such national importance, it is necessary to clarify basic policy principles at home and abroad. It goes without saying that diplomatic negotiations are made possible by adjusting the different positions between the countries concerned. This is even more reason why basic policies must not be left ambiguous.

After studying base conditions with all these complex military and political conditions in mind, we came to the conclusions below. We believe these are the most appropriate conclusions not only in view of the military-strategic value of the Okinawa bases but also from the longer perspective of political relations between Japan and the United States in the future.

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II. Our Conclusions

As a result of our deliberations, we came to the conclusion that the return of the administrative rights in Okinawa and the treatment of American military bases on such occasion should be handled according to the following basic policies:

(A) A decision for the enbloc return of the administrative rights in Okinawa should be reached within the year 1969 and the timing set during this year also. As to the time for reversion, it is desirable that it be the sooner the better. It should be before 1972.

(B) After the return of administrative rights, the US-Japan Security Treaty should fully apply to Okinawa. Therefore, the American bases in the said area should come under the Status of Forces Agreement under the US-Japan Security Treaty, and naturally be subjected to the article on prior consultation as stipulated in the exchanged documents accompanying the Security Treaty.

(C) There is a great concentrations of American military bases in Okinawa and not a few bases are closely intermixed with areas occupied by the local populace. Therefore, it is desirable to reduce and consolidate American bases insofar as possible before reversion.

After the return, Japan will assume primary responsibility for the defense of Okinawa, and take charge of land defense, coastal patrol and local air defense. It is necessary, therefore, to speed up plans for the transfer of bases involved in such functions.

(D) Along with the decision for the return of administrative rights, in order to promote a smooth execution of the reversion, a joint Japan-US consultative body should be established.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

III. Summary of Deliberations

The following is the summary of our deliberations on which conclusions were reached.

(1) The Asian situation and the roles of Japan and the United States

(a) With the moves toward an end of the Vietnam War and the advent of a new president, the United States may show some changes in her stance toward foreign affairs. Its general direction will be to limit as much as possible America's one-nation role as policeman of the world, and to ask the free nations to share more of the role and responsibility for the maintenance of peace. In the Asian area, she will try as much as possible to avoid automatically shouldering the defense burden as she did in the Korean War or the Vietnam War, and will seek to strengthen the structure for self-reliance and self-help by the Asian nations. In that case, she will expect Japan to play as major a role as possible, including regional economic cooperation.

The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese People's Republic is approaching the wrap-up stage, but her political situation still has not emerged from the bounds of political instability, and big econimic scars still remain. Rebuilding the party and government control organs that have incurred major blows in this process will still take a number of years. It is conceivable that China's political and econimic instability will restrain any positive actions in her foreign affairs. On the other hand, that suggests that there are possibilities for sudden and unpredictable changes in both her domestic and her foreign policies.

China's development of nuclear weapons may aim chiefly at deterrent power vis-a-vis the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and at the political effects that nuclear arms have; with the tempo of that development having slowed down somewhat of late, China's

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ability to develop any considerable number of operational ICBM's may be delayed beyond 1975. Her capacity is limited and America will be able to provide herself and the Asian nations with a highly reliable deterrent power against Chinese nuclears for a considerable period of time from now. Furthermore, moves to end the Vietnam War could be an effective factor for easing the tensions in Sino-US relations.

In connection with the above-noted changes in America and the withdrawal of British forces from east of Suez, the Soviet Union may try to expand her influence in Asia. However, Soviet econimic and political interest in the area east of Southeast Asia, except for North Korea and Japan, is not as high as it is toward the Middle East and South Asia, nor do we believe that her military influence will become as strong there as it is in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Her recent build-up of naval power has drawn attention; but we do not think she has the intention or capacity to develop her fighting power in the Pacific or Indian Oceans in a form that would make it a match for America's Seventh Fleet. Rather, attention should be given to its political influence.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula has continued in recent years to be unstable due to the North Korean Government's having made clear its line of armed unification. But we feel that both the US and USSR tend to agree on considering this area a zone for the balancing of power between east and west, instead of as a place for expanding their power. It seems that China, too, is receptive, though to a different degree, to the same idea. Consequently, so long as prudent handling by the US, USSR and China continues, the possibility of minor clashes in this area expanding into large-scale local warfare is felt to be extremely slight.

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Japan lacks the military power to exercise any role beyond her own direct defense; but her economy is still continuing its high annual growth rate of around 10%, and she has already become the world's number-three industrial nation. Japan's GNP in about 1975 is predicted to reach a size almost equal to the GNP of all Asia including China.

The above is a general outline of the East Asian situation. Of course, looked at in detail, the situation is far more complex and cannot be wrapped up with any single conclusion. Needless to say, the chances for a great number of contradictions do exist.

(b) However, on the matter of Okinawa's reversion, most important among these factors are the changing roles of America and Japan and the future of cooperative relations between the two countries. In America, in the course of ending the Vietnam War, her reconsideration of her strategy and policies toward Asia will proceed in directions such as stated above. Also, with the unfolding of military technology, her policies on military deployment in the Western Pacific could undergo some change. As a natural consequence of developing national power, Japan will seek out a role in Asian and world politics and, reflecting the development of her nationalism, will try to assert her own positions more positively.

Amid such changes, Japan and America have begun to seek a way toward a relationship of a sort of equal cooperation in the Asian area. What has now come up on the schedule is the matter of Okinawa's reversion. In short, the reversion of Okinawa has such importance as to be termed the completion of the changes in Japan-US relations that have gradually evolved from the occupation relationship to a cooperative relationship. Consequently, the matter of Okinawa's reversion must be handled from a viewpoint which is that broad.

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It must be stressed that foreign relations in the nuclear age are not determined entirely by relative military power, but are determined by the overall strength deriving from economic power, political intentions, social stability, and so forth. The militarily bipolar and politically multipolar reality of the world structure constitute reasons for further strengthening the awareness of this. Even in co-operative relationships between nations it is necessary to maximize such overall strength. Much should not be lost in terms of overall strength as a consequence of not weakening the military relationships of one specific period. In short, the matter of Okinawa's reversion must not be treated only from the viewpoint of Far East security in the narrow sense; and, what is more, the question must not be dominated solely by consideration for what is called the preservation of Okinawa's military functions.

For Japan to be able to bring to bear her own overall strength and play a more positive role in Asia, she cannot take over the American role as is, but her own policies and strategy must be asserted and adjustments must be made between the two countries. A basic principle of Japan's foreign policy is to minimize the role of military strength in international politics. It is Japan's basic idea that Asian stability is achievable by planning the internal stabilization of the Asian nations through econimic co-operation and other non-military means rather than through military endeavors; and Japan, in the context of its rapid development of national power, has begun to realize more and more that she can contribute to Asian stability through this policy.

Thus, both Japan and the U.S. have come to have quite a broad range of options on means for achieving Asian stability. While staying aware of these changing conditions and paying heed to their basic interest in further developing

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the relationship between them, the two nations must resolve the matter of Okinawa's reversion.

The solution of this matter is urgently required. For a quarter of a century the people of Okinawa Prefecture have been kept under foreign domination. And coupled with this, huge military bases on Okinawa, is giving rise to grave problems both in economic and in human terms.

It is no longer permissible for the situation to be left as is. Again, the situational changes occurring in Japan, the U.S. and in Asia are extremely rapid and require prompt responses. Vacillation and procrastination would only complicate the problem and make a solution more difficult, and a good chance for a positive solution would be lost.

Fortunately, influential opinion is growing in both Japan and the United States that during 1969 the reversion of Okinawan administration rights should be decided on, with reversion to take place during 1972. This opportunity must not be lost.

(2) U.S. military bases and reversion of administrative rights

(a) Okinawa has been called "the keystone of the Pacific" and is said to be the nucleus for American strategy in the Far East area.

It has been explained that in the Okinawa bases all levels of fighting forces are positioned or could be positioned such as could respond to any form of war from nuclear war to guerrilla war, and that the maintaining of such Okinawa bases is indispensable to deter war. That is the basis for asserting the necessity of continuing such functions in handling the reversion of Okinawa.

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As against this, the importance can be emphasized, first, of the two considerations that Asian stability, as stated above, has the nature of not being achievable basically by military efforts alone, and that measures must not be adopted such as would detract from promoting ccoperation for the sake of increasing the overall strength for stability.

In addition, even from the military aspect, it must be pointed out that the situation must not be made too inflexible. The base functions are not something whose value cannot be brought out unless they are completely endowed with everything.

The position of the Okinawa bases in America's Far East strategy is not all-powerful or unique and absolute when emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula or the China mainland are considered. In relationship to the bases in Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, Guam and so forth, their strategic value is only relative and supplementary. In comparison to the two big naval ports of Yokosuka and Sasebo, the value of Okinawa as a naval base is quite low. As air bases too, the Okinawa bases can be given weight for their geographic location in relationship to the several air bases in Guam and in Japan proper. For an emergency situation in the Far East, it is the bases in Japan proper that have the greater value for their dispersed positioning and the latent capacity behind them.

Also, it is generally understood that while the American bases in Okinawa and Japan proper will continue to have a great value for mutual defense, changing technology should enable a more or less steady reduction, over time in the U.S. peacetime presence in these areas.

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(b) As to the question of the deployment of nuclear weapons which is the main focus of the issue regarding the conditions of American military bases after the return of Okinawa, it is our conclusion that there is only marginal importance of actual presence of nuclears on Okinawa.

First, changes in the technology of weapons delivery and in techniques of control and logistic support have diminished and will continue to diminish the value of nuclear operations from "close-in" bases.

A decade ago, close-in nuclear bases played a large role in the deterrence of nuclear attack. At a stage when American strategic nuclear attacking powers had a limited retaliatory force quantitively and qualitively, the strategic bomber units and medium-range missiles were deployed at overseas bases to supplement them. This situation has altered drastically. Most of the force is made up of ballistic missiles that can be launched from the continental United States or from ocean areas to distant targets. And the manned bombers which constitute but a slight retaliatory nuclear force have an operational range much agreater than before. Overseas bases, even at the time, were open to a much wider variety of attacks with larger payloads and greater accuracies and with much less warning than bases inside the United States. The vulnerability problem, if anything, may have worsened for overseas bases as compared to bases at intercontinental range. For such reasons, the role of overseas bases have played a sharply diminishing role in strategic deterrence.

It nas been said that even vulnerable close-in bases would make an important contribution to nuclear deterrence by providing warning of a nuclear attack. It was held that either the overseas bases would be attacked first and so

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provide extra warning to the continental United States, or they would be left untouched and therefore able to retaliate and disrupt an opening enemy salvo. But, studies in the United States have concluded that vulnerable nuclear bases overseas would not be adequate to assure a warning.

For the purpose of deterring nuclear war, then, overseas basing of nuclear vehicles has a sharply reduced importance. In case deterrence fails, it has seemed in the past that nuclear strikes launched from overseas, because they would start from close by, would have an advantage of more quickly spoiling an enemy attack and so limiting the damage an enemy might do to Japan or to the United States. However, this potential function too has declined in importance over time with the great increase in the speed, weight and precision of a nuclear attack from far off. At the same time, the availability of sea-based and other close-in means has greatly diminished the value of the "close-in" Okinawa base.

Secondly, the value of Okinawa as a base for retaining and storing small tactical nuclear weapons or so-called battle-field nuclear weapons is greatly diminishing. In the days when Communist China had not developed strategic nuclear weapons, a strategy would have been possible of countering overwhelmingly superior conventional forces with small tactical nuclears used locally in stages; but hereafter there will be no meaning to normally keeping tactical nuclears at close-in bases no further than 360 nautical miles from the continent for the sake of defending those bases or in readiness against an emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere.

The Vietnam War is showing that the deterrent power of nuclear weapons has no effect in this kind of war. Even if it were necessary to have short-range battlefield

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

nuclear weapons, technology has so developed that it is possible to store nuclears on ships without the kind of political problems as might arise in Okinawa. Also, it should be pointed out that transportation has become so fast that the time needed to move weapons to the battle-field has been reduced.

On the whole, it has become widely accepted that, with the development of theories of arms control, it is desirable that, for deterrent effect, the deployment of nuclear weapons be kept as limited as possible. For that reason, it is particularly stressed that nuclear weapons not be located on foreign soil unless the recipient nation has strongly requested it. Such considerations have become one basis for the NPT constituting an urgent matter, with their idea being that nuclear controls by the super-powers not become more complicated than at present.

In this sense, it can be considered to be not only in Japan's interest but also in America's not to place nuclears in Okinawa.

(c) The second focal point for handling of the bases after reversion concerns the problem of the application of the documents exchanged under Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applying to use of the bases even for conventional weapons. Our conclusion on this point is as stated at the outset: we judge it to be desirable for both the United States and for Japan that the Okinawa bases receive the same treatment as these in Japan proper. For, we hold that in this case, the added value obtaining from being able to operate without "prior consultation" would be quite limited in comparison to the value of the military actions that are permitted in Japan proper or in comparison to military actions within the same framework of limitations

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on Okinawa. Also. we hold that the value gained would be extremely small as compared to the political loss that could be incurred from having the bases treated differently from those in Japan proper. Instead, we think it is vital to give consideration to not creating factors that would suppress changes in Japan that have began to proceed toward a more positive stance.

When localized, non-nuclear wars break out in the Far East, close-in bases such as in Okinawa play an important role in operations. Also, the fact that these base clusters are always in a completely and effectively ready condition in peacetime and the units stationed there are in shape to be able to take counter-actions immediately are an important element for deterring the outbreak of local wars. In order to give these war-deterrence forces the maximum effectiveness, there must not be even the slightest uneasiness about the reliability that the bases have. But, the added value that they could gain from being kept in a condition where they could be used without "prior consultation" in case of the use of such conventional forces would be extremely limited in the realistic contingencies conceivable henceforth. In the unfortunate event that a war should break out in the Far East, fast operational moves from these bases would be very important. In such instances, it is most likely that the use of military force would be indispensable for both Japan and the United States. Thus, in such a case, it could not be carried out at all without consultation. Moreover, progress in information techniques have made possible the comparatively early discovery of changes in the situation, and rapid developments in communication technology make it possible for the time used technologically for consultations between governments to be drastically shortened, if they are just ready.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

One operational move that would require a faster response would be that in case of a surprise attack occurring against a base. However, as soon as the Security Treaty is fully applied after reversion of administrative rights, "actions to meet the common danger" would be taken on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty, in the face of such a situation. I.e., we think that there would be a situation separate from that requiring prior consultation under Article 6.

With her increase in national power, Japan has taken a more positive stance in the politics of the world and Asia. This change should be taken into consideration for such cases, too. It is Japan more than the United States that has a direct interest in Far Eastern security. By giving serious weight to Japan's judgment, America would be able to avoid an over-hasty military response. By Japan's becoming a nation with a greater interest in the stability of the Far East, she would have to be expected to able to cooperate further with America on this point. By trusting and nurturing such changes on the part of Japan, America would be able to see further improvement in the exchange of views between the two countries in time of emergency.

(3) Okinawa's reversion and Japan's security policies

(a) As an island nation close to the continent, Japan has to secure export markets, import markets and trade routes in order to survive and prosper. That shows that it is vitally important for Japan's existence that there be peace and security in the region from the Western Pacific through Southeast Asia.

However, in present circumstances, these areas hold the posibility of conflicts, with the tension between North Korea and the ROK, with the new situation accompanying China's development of nuclear arms, with the instability

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of the Southeast Asian region, with the Soviet Union's emergence onto the seas, and so forth. Needless to say, for Japan to shut herself off with an isolationist stance would be no solution of the problem, in view of her position as an oceanic nation.

Yet, the scope of defense through Japan's military power is to attack and hold out against invading and landing forces, anti-aircraft defense, searching for and destroying submarines in her littoral waters, protection of convoys, guarding and blockade of straits, coastal patrol, etc. Its capacity is quite limited to secure the skies and seas over a broader area. Here, there is a need for the deterrence and dispute-avoidance role which the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the Security Treaty brings. In that sense, the function of the U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan proper must be correctly rated.

For Japan, her own security and the security of the Far East region essentially have a close connection. As Japan grows economically, the more she enlarges the range of her activities, the more that interconnection becomes clear. But, so far she has not been able to cut free completely from a sense of continuing to be under an occupation; and her idea of being isolated from international politics resulted in a rupture between the two.

Of late, that rupture is slowly being cemented over. Reversion of Okinawa in the form discussed above would further stimulate the changes now proceeding in Japan. Along with the further restoration of Japan's confidence and pride, we could expect a rise in her sense of having a role and responsibility in international society.

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(b) In such instance, also, Japan's military capability would still be as limited as under present political conditions. Still, Japanese military expenditures in 1969 exceeded 1.3 billion dollars and would approach 3 billion dollars by 1975 if the present rate of increase continues. Furthermore, contributions to international security in the present age should not rely solely on military power. Instead, they should be in the context of overall power, which depends on high-level technology, big economic power, political and social stability and so on. There will be greater weight attached to Japan's capacity for dispute and crisis management in the fields of economic cooperation with the Asian nations, contributions to UN peacekeeping actions and its independent endeavors for international peace and security.

Of course, the reversion of Okinawa raises the matter of Japan's strengthening her efforts for autonomous defense. In this instance, efforts for autonomous defense do not mean only expanding here military power. Instead, in light of the bipolarized U.S.-Soviet military structure, it is natural, and will be effective for a method of approach separate from that to be taken. However, with the return of Okinawa a build-up of defense power adequate to protect that area will be necessary. The outlook for a build-up of Japan's autonomous defensive power along with her econoric development is at the basis of our assertion that the gradual reduction of U.S. forces station in Japan is possible.

What is important in connection with the U.S.-Japan security set-up that it remain always possible for Japan to join with the U.S. on a mutual and equal basis in re-evaluating what is demanded for Japan's own security and for securing Asian peace and security. It is desirable for both Japan and the United States that she (Japan) develop as a responsible and

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independent power. So long as both are independent nations each with its own differing ideas and interests, it is quite natural that many complicated problems involving conflicts between the two nations should arise henceforth. But, it must be the common goal of Japan and the United States to cooperate to the maximum extent possible to achieve an "equal partnership", even while making it clear that both nations have their own national interests and their own assertions based thereon, and while both frankly recognize differences as differences and confirm what they can and cannot do. We are aware that the reversion of Okinawa offers an important opportunity to move toward achieving that goal.

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IV. Prospects and Topics

This, after all, will have to be given direction so that the solution of the Okinawa problem will become the foundation for making the Japan-U.S. political relationship develop into something even more equal and vigorous. There already exists between Japan and the United States a relationship of common interests that is growing ever closer in economic, technological, cultural and other fields. In the Asian area, both nations have political objectives with aspects that fundamentally coincide. It is, indeed, the concerted action between the two free, strong and independent oceanic nations on both shores of the Pacific that will be the key henceforth to Asian peace and progress. Without the friendly relations between these two nations there can be no stabilization of the overall situation in this area. We believe that the negotiations for Okinawa's reversion should proceed upon such a vision.

At the same time, we must take into account the fact that the return of administrative rights in Okinawa calls for developmental changes in both nations' security policies in the Western Pacific and Far East area, and thus in the cooperative relationships of the two nations under the current security treaty.

First, is the revision that can be foreseen in America's Far East strategy. With the reversion of administrative rights, a change will naturally take place in the political status of the Okinawa bases. When placed under Japanese sovereignty, the Okinawa bases, after all, will not only have to be consolidated and reduced but also it will be difficult to avoid their being placed under greater political limitations on their use than heretofore. Consequently, America's Far East strategy will have to be taken up in the near future for revision or revamping. We believe that the U.S. Government is already proceeding with a reconsideration of its Asian policies and military strategy to cope with the situation "after Vietnam." And, in so doing, it may be giving consideration also

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to the problems that will naturally come with the above changes in Okinawa's position.

Second, in one respect, that will increase the independent role and responsibilities of Japan under the present Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The strengthening of our nation's autonomy in its foreign and security policies would be a direction hard to avoid in light of the political plurality of the world structure. Also, with the rapid development of military transport technology by sea and air, it is expected that in the 1970's America's main military forces will gradually become concentrated on the U.S. mainland and there will be a corresponding downward trend in dependence on overseas bases. These factors will bring qualitative changes in the global alliance relationships which the U.S. formed in the cold war era. Similarly, it is expected that U.S.-Japan relations under the Security Treaty will be revised in the very near future in the direction of strengthening Japan's autonomy and responsibility.

Of course, the strengthening of Japan's autonomy will, in one respect, strengthen the necessity for political consultations with the U.S. Political consultations can only have real significance and vigor when they are premised on there being two independent policies and strategies. Through political consultations, both Japan and the United States will be able to deepen their mutual understanding and strengthen their syster of competition and co-operation. Thus, in the 1970's Japan and the United States will be able to enter into a new and more active relationship of alliance.

Also, it must be noted that problems of national security in the nuclear age area quite complicated and loaded with nuances, making necessary multi-faceted and creative overall strategies. We have noted that the political debates so far on our nation's security problems have tended to be heavily based on legal theories and too lacking in substantive discussion. We believe that there can be no independent, creative security policy, or foreign policy either, where substantive debates do not take place.

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From the above viewpoints, we have concluded that a general and deep-probing re-consideration of our nation's security policies is urgently demanded. The establishment of autonomy in Japan's diplomatic and security policies will, we believe, facilitate the revamping of America's Asian policies and Far East strategy and contribute to smoothing the reversion of administrative rights in Okinawa.

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By WBP NARA Date 7/25/02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Tokyo 4410
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 04410 031221Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, ACDA 16, UPW 01, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28,

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R 031017Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6564
INFO /HICOMRY

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SUBJ: OKINAWA: JAPANESE PRESS SPECULATION ON NUCLEAR-FREE REVERSION

1. JUNE 3 EVENING TOKYO PRESS FEATURES REPLAY OF JUNE 2 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE BY HEDRICK SMITH SPECULATING THAT US IS PREPARED REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA AND WOULD FOLLOW THIS LINE IF JAPANESE WERE COOPERATIVE REGARDING FUTURE DEPLOYMENT US FORCES FROM JAPAN AND OKINAWA. ACCORDING ASAHI, SMITH STORY HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN FIRMLY DENIED BY EITHER GOJ OR USG SPOKESMEN.

2. DONOWAKI (ACTING CHIEF/NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIVISION, FONOFF) TOLD EMBOFF JUNE 3 THAT FINN HAD TOLD CHIBA SMITH STORY IS PURE SPECULATION AND THAT EMBASSY TOKYO WOULD BE SO NOTIFIED.

3. EMBASSY HAS NOT REPEAT NOT YET RECEIVED INQUIRIES ON THESE REPORTS, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE. EXEMPT. BARGER

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XR DEF 15 RYU IS - US

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 01883 121135Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,LI 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 1883

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HICOMRY PASS AMCONUNIT

OA FOR ODCSOPS PASS ODUSA (IA)

SUBJ: OKINAWA: PRIMIN'S MARCH 10 REPLIES IN DIET

REF: TOKYO 1790 - POL 19 RYU IS
XR DEF 15 RYU IS - US

1. EVENING PRESS MARCH 10 AND MORNING PRESS MARCH 11 HEADLINED PRIMIN SATO'S REPLIES TO QUESTIONS BY SOCIALIST MEMBER TAN MAEKAWA IN UPPER HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE SESSION MORNING MARCH 10. LEADS SUGGEST SATO HAD MADE MAJOR POLICY DEPARTURE BY GIVING COMMITMENT THAT HE WOULD NEGOTIATE TOWARD RETURN OF OKINAWA WITHOUT NUKES. MEDIA (INCLUDING MORNING RADIO NEWS) HAVE JUMPED TO CONCLUSION THAT GOJ HAS ADOPTED IN TOTO RECOMMENDATIONS CARRIED IN "KUSUMI REPORT" (REF) AND NOW SEEKS "HOMELAND LEVEL" WITH FLEXIBLE INTERPRETATION OF PRIOR CONSULTATION UNDER US/JAPAN SECURITY TREATY. WE FIND NO SUCH MAJOR POLICY DEPARTURES IN WHAT SATO ACTUALLY SAID, BUT EXCHANGE WITH MAEKAWA WAS OF UNUSUAL LENGTH AND INTEREST. THE TONE, MORE THAN THE SUBSTANCE, OF SATO'S REPLIES INDICATES HE INTENDS WORK TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE OKINAWA, BUT HE ADMITTED LACK OF KNOWLEDGE RE ACTUAL STRATEGIC SITUATION AND AVOIDED ANY PREDICTIONS ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 01790 01 OF 02 101213Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO E 15,IO 13,ACOA 16,AID 28,CIAE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,
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DA WASHDC
CINCPAC HAWAII
CINCUSARPAC
HICOMRY OKINAWA
COMUS JAPAN

C O N F I O E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 1790

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

POL 19 RYU IS
XR POL 6 JAPAN

SUBJ: OKINAWA: OHAMA BASES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT

REFS: A. TOKYO A-1634 OF JUNE 14, 1968
B. TOKYO A-119 OF FEBRUARY 14, 1969

POL 19 RYU IS

BEGIN SUMMARY

1. BASES SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRED BY MILITARY COMMENTATOR TADO KUSUMI (A SUBSIDIARY ORGAN OF NOBUMOTO OHAMA'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO PRIMIN SATO ON OKINAWA) RELEASED ITS LONG-HERALDED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE OKINAWA REVERSION MARCH 8. REPORT CLEARLY ADVOCATES CONTINUED JAPANESE RELIANCE UPON SECURITY TREATY RELATIONSHIPS WITH US, BUT CALLS FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA BY 1972, EXPRESSES SKEPTICISM ABOUT US NEED FOR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ON OKINAWA, AND COMES OUT BASICALLY FOR "HOMELAND-LEVEL" (NO NUCLEAR

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

INFO: HICOMRY Naha
CINCPAC

SUBJECT: OKINAWA - B-52s

Following are pertinent excerpts frm Department's daily news briefing ofJanuary 31, 1969 re Okinawa:

QUESTION: Bob, Mr. Reischauer has urged the removal of nuclear stockpiles on Okinawa. Do you have any comment on this?

ANSWER: No, sir

QUESTION: Sir, about the general strike scheduled next week in Okinawa, are there any efforts being made by the United States Government to avert it?

QUESTION: To What?

QUESTION: To do what?

QUESTION: Avert it.

ANSWER: I don't know that one could say that. We are aware of the possibility of a general strike. We are aware

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

JUN 14 1969
DATE

MEMORANDUM FOR: RS/AN - Mrs. Swartz

SUBJECT: Processing of Memoranda of Conversation

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9 - 6/11

Washington, D.C. 20520

LOU ATTACHMENT

June 9, 1969

J - Mr. Monjo

Memorandum of conversation between Under Secretary Johnson and Eki Sone, DSP Member Lower House - May 29, 1969

For approval prior to distribution. The Under Secretary's remarks are sidelined in red.

This memorandum of conversation was drafted in EA/J by Mr. Straus.

for John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Okinawa, B-52's Prior Consultation, U.S. Bases

Approved as drafted

Approved as amended

S/S-S:WSShepard:jb

LOU ATTACHMENT

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HICOM and CINCPAC for POLAD Honolulu

There follows excerpts from the transcript of the Department's noon briefing of June 3:

Q. Bob, do you have any comment on a story concerning Okinawa and disposition of nuclear weapons?

A. No decisions, either with respect to the future status of Okinawa nor on U.S. military equipment on the island has been made. The President has asked the Secretary to begin discussions and exploratory negotiationw with the Japanese Government on the matter of Okinawa. Until those issues have been thoroughly explored and discussed with the Japanese -- and that will take several months, at least -- no firm U.S. decisions will be taken.

Q. Then are you denying that consideration has been given to some sort of package type deal involving withdrawal of arms for a certain peak timeframe of return of the Ryukyus?

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Drafted by: EA/P:RNKilpatrick:eb 6/3/69 Tel. Ext. 5360
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/P - Mr. Levine
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

30

DATE: May 29, 1969

SUBJECT: Okinawa, B-52's Prior Consultation, U.S. Bases

Participants: Eki Sone, DSP Member Lower House
Eiichi Nagasue, DSP Member Lower House
~~PARTICIPANTS~~: Tetsuya Tabuchi, DSP Member Upper House

Herbert Passin, Professor, Columbia University
Gerald Curtis, Professor, Columbia University

~~COPIES TO~~: U. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Department of State

Ulrich A. Straus, Country Officer for Japan (EA/J)

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DEF 15 JAPAN-US

Sone gave the Under Secretary a rundown on the DSP's talks with both hawks and doves in Congress. The Under Secretary said he was glad that they had gotten a variety of view points. Sone mentioned that in addition to political issues, including Okinawa, his group was concerned with economic matters. Both the auto and textile industry were represented on his delegation. The Under Secretary mentioned that voluntary export controls on textiles has powerful political support in this country. One of the President's few commitments when he entered office related to the textile issue.

Nagasue raised the B-52 issue. The Under Secretary said he had nothing to add to what has previously been stated. We do not intend for the aircraft to be permanently stationed in Okinawa. We are hoping they can be removed. However, they continue to be very important at the present time. Sone said the B-52's constitute a problem for Chief Executive Yara. He does not know what will happen if the B-52's are not removed by the end of June. Sone said that Yara now regrets he said what he did about their removal.

3 cards made

When the conversation turned to prior consultation, the Under

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Secretary stated that the US faces a major political problem in the event of a Japanese veto on the use of US bases in Japan in a Korean contingency. Japan must have confidence that the US will not act recklessly; the US must have confidence we can support our forces. Our chief aim continues to be to deter potential aggression and to discourage particularly an attack by the North Koreans. It is in this context that we view the Okinawa issue. The Under Secretary said that given the present U.S. mood, Japan could probably bargain us not only out of Okinawa but out of Japan and Korea as well. This is not the way the problem should be viewed in Japan. Japan should decide what kind of U.S. posture best serves Japan's security requirements. He felt that Japan had not yet thought through this question.

Sone said he did not want Japan to be nuclear armed. The Under Secretary mentioned that the answer lay in close mutual cooperation in the defense field. For example we have offered to return a number of bases, including sizeable holdings in downtown Yokohama but the JDA does not have money for building replacement facilities elsewhere. Nagasue mentioned it was becoming more and more difficult to move bases from one site to another; the Japanese public is interested only in removing U.S. bases entirely.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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RS/R

May 6, 1969
~~April 29, 1969~~

Richard S. Masington, Esquire
Spence, Payne and Masington
Suite 801, City National Bank Building
Miami, Florida 33130

DEF 15 RYU IS-US

Dear Mr. Masington:

Thank you for your letter of April 23, 1969 clarifying your original request concerning the status of the island of Okinawa. I understand fully your concern respecting the confidentiality of your request, and I will see that your letter does not jeopardize the benefits presently enjoyed by your clients.

In brief, the answer to your basic question is that there had been no modification of the sovereign status of Okinawa as of September 16, 1968; nor, indeed, has there been any such modification since that date. The island continues to be governed by the United States pursuant to our occupation rights following World War II, and, since April 28, 1952, pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The President of the United States provided for U.S. administration of Okinawa, as part of the Ryukyu Islands, in Executive Order 10713 of June 5, 1957, approximately the same time as the Court of Appeals judgment in Burna v. U.S. Since then, the President has issued two subsequent Executive Orders pertaining to the Ryukyus. Executive Order 11010 of March 19, 1962 established the Civil Administration of the Ryukyus under jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense. Executive Order 11263 of December 20, 1965 provided for election by the Ryukyuan population of the Chief Executive of the Ryukyus. While these Executive Orders would merit your close scrutiny, it would not seem that they alter the status of Okinawa for the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act. In fact, since an element of their combined effect is to provide greater

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voice in their administration to the indigenous population, the Orders would tend to support the court decisions finding that Okinawa is a "foreign country" for purposes of that Act.

Sincerely yours,

Charles A. Schmitz
Attorney-Adviser
Office of the Legal Adviser

Concurrence:
EA/J - Mr. McElroy

L/EA:CASchmitz:awr 4/29/69

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J. D. SPENCE
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RICHARD S. MASINGTON

25 WEST FLAGLER STREET
TELEPHONE 377-0641
AREA CODE 305

April 23, 1969

Charles A. Schmitz
Attorney-Adviser
Office of the Legal Adviser
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Re: Shannon Loadholtz

Dear Mr. Schmitz:

Thank you for your reply to my inquiry about the sovereign status of the island of Okinawa.

Allow me to be more specific as to the nature of my client's problem. My client is a former Air Force Sergeant whose son was a patient in a military hospital on Okinawa. The infant son sustained injury which we suspect to be a result of negligent treatment.

We have been investigating the possibility of suing the Federal Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 US.C.A. 1346(b).

However, under 28 U.S.C.A. section 2680, an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity is created. Specifically, subsection (k) of section 2680 provides that the Tort Claims Act shall not apply to any claim arising in a "foreign country".

The cases interpreting the meaning of what is a "foreign country" as it relates to Okinawa are:

1. Burna v. U.S., 240 Fed. 2nd 720 (1957)
2. Cobb v. U.S., 191 Fed. 2nd 604 (1951)
3. Brewer v. U.S., 79 Fed. Supp. 405 (1948)

Richard S. Masington

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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Under these cases it appears that for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, our courts have ruled that Okinawa is a "foreign country".

The purpose of my inquiry, therefore, is to determine whether or not there has been any modification of the sovereign status of that island as of September 16, 1968, which is the date upon which this child sustained injury.

I note with interest the case of Callas v. U.S. 253 Fed. 2nd 842, involving the island of Kwajalien, which apparently because of its trusteeship status has been held not to be a "foreign country" within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.

Accordingly, any additional information you may be able to offer on the above subject would be appreciated.

I want to add a further caution, however. This child has been designated by the Secretary of the Army for further free medical care at the Walter Reed Army Hospital. The parents have asked me to try in every way to avoid jeopardizing that benefit which has been bestowed upon them. That is my intention. At this point, I am simply evaluating the legal status of their possible claim, and I wish to do nothing to disturb any benefits which they now enjoy. I am sure you can appreciate the position that I am in and that you will limit your activity in connection with this matter to the legal inquiry we have made.

Thank you for your anticipated continued cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Richard S. Masington

RSM/af
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON OKINAWA BASES

1. PRESS APRIL 27 QUOTED PRIME MINISTER DURING INTERPELLATION BY NATION ASSEMBLY APRIL 26 ON DEFENSE MATTERS AS SAYING THAT SOME US FACILITIES HAD ALREADY BEEN MOVED FROM OKINAWA TO KOREA. ADDED NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY TO MOVE ADDITIONAL FACILITIES.

2. DURING COURTESY CALL ON PM APRIL 28 BY DCM AND OUTGOING USFK CHIEF OF STAFF, PM TOOK INITIATIVE IN DENYING THIS STORY. SAID HE TOLD NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THAT SOME US AIRCRAFT HAD COME FROM OKINAWA FOR PROTECTION OF US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND FOR AUGMENTATION IN KOREA. PM PROTESTED UNRELIABILITY OF PRESS.
PORTER

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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Approved in S - Mr. Robinson

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

6951

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 28, 1969

SUBJECT: Okinawa; The Secretary's Trip to Korea and Japan

PARTICIPANTS:

KOREA
His Excellency PARK, Choong Hoon, Deputy Prime Minister, Head of Economic Planning Board
His Excellency KIM Dong Jo, Ambassador of Korea
Mr. YANG Yoon Sae, Director of the Office of Investment Promotion, Economic Planning Board
Mr. CHOI Kwang Soo, Counselor for Economic Affairs, Korean Embassy

US
The Secretary
Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Henry Bardach, Country Officer for Korea
Mr. Cleo F. Shook, Director, Office of Northeast Asia and Philippines Affairs

DEF 15 RYU IS-US KROK

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C	White House	Amembassy Seoul	
D		Amembassy Tokyo	

Park expressed the concern of the ROKG about the future of our bases on Okinawa and the ROK desire that we consult with them as this situation develops. The Secretary responded that we would.

The Secretary said that he would visit Japan in July. In response to Park's question, the Secretary said that he also hoped to visit Korea at that time. Park responded that he was most pleased that he could report the Secretary's wish to visit Korea to President Park.

EA/K:HBardach:paw
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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FORM DS-1254
2-65

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

#6

8 MAY 1969
DATE

DEF 15 MAY 12 45

MEMORANDUM FOR: RS/AN - Mrs. Swartz

SUBJECT: Processing of Memoranda of Conversation

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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SECRET ATTACHMENTS

May 2, 1969

S - Mr. Robinson

Memoranda of conversation between the Secretary and Korean Deputy Prime Minister Park Choong Hoon - April 28, 1969

For approval prior to distribution.
The Secretary's remarks are sidelined in red.
These memoranda were drafted in EA/K by Mr. Bardach.

for John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. ROK Participation in Viet-Nam
   Approved as drafted
   Approved as amended
2. US Economic Assistance; Private Investment; Import Restrictions
   Approved as drafted
   Approved as amended
3. Okinawa; The Secretary's Trip to Korea and Japan
   Approved as drafted
   Approved as amended
4. EC-121 Incident; North Korean Intentions; US Military Assistance
   Approved as drafted
   Approved as amended

Please check w/ ref. re intelligence activities on p. 7 should be TOP SECRET

PET 15 KYO 05

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Seoul 2117
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PAGE 01 SEOUL 02117 270208Z

80
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SSO 00, RSR 01, /081 W
036126

P 270200Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5957
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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PRIME MINISTER TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT HEADLINES IN LOCAL PRESS TO EFFECT THAT HE MADE STATEMENT IN ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY THAT "PART OF U.S. BASES IN OKINAWA MOVED HERE" WAS MISREPRESENTATION OF WHAT HE SAID. PRIME MIN INFORMED ASSEMBLY THAT "SOME AIRCRAFT FROM BASES IN OKINAWA HAD BEEN MOVED TO KOREA", BUT HE DECLINED TO SPECULATE ON PARTS OF US INSTALLATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO KOREA. PORTER

(2)

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 03267 251015Z

20
ACTION EA 15

INFO JPM 04,CIAE 00,DODE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,P 04,RSC 01,USIA 12,RSR 01,
UPW 01,AID 28,/073 W ---------- 026224

P R 250730Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
INFO COMUSJAPAN FUCHU
7/13AF UDORN RTAFB
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SECSTATE WASHDC 5903

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 3267

SUBJ: TRAVEL OF ASAHI SHIMBUN REPORTER

REF: BANGKOK 5022

1. WHILE YOSHINAKA NOT PERSONALLY KNOWN TO EMBASSY WE UNDERSTAND THAT PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IS TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON THAI REACTION TO US MILITARY PRESENCE. HE REPORTEDLY SPEAKS ENGLISH WELL AND IS A MEMBER OF THE PRESS CLUB AT US FORCES JAPAN.

2. AS REPORTER FOR ONE OF WORLD'S LARGEST NEWSPAPERS YOSHINAKA SHOULD NATURALLY ALSO BE PERMITTED TO VISIT U-TAPAO IF OTHER FOREIGN REPORTERS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED SAME PRIVILEGE. IN VIEW OF CONTINUING SPECULATION HERE ON JUNE-JULY REMOVAL OF B-52'S FROM OKINAWA, EMBASSY EXPECTS THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT HE IS TOLD YOSHINAKA WILL PROBABLY WEAVE FURTHER SPECULATION ON THIS THEME INTO WHATEVER HE WRITES ABOUT HIS VISIT. WE BELIEVE THAT BEST RESPONSE TO ANY QUERY OF HIS REGARDING B-52'S ON OKINAWA WOULD BE THAT NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE RELATING TO FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS OF B-52'S.

GP-3 OSBORN

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(11)

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Seoul 1748 4-9-69

PAGE 01 SEOUL 01748 091037Z

11
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,
RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,IO 13,UPW 01,ACDA 16,RSR 01,?111 W
055816

R 090810Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5670
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 1748

SUBJ: OKINAWA

REF SEOUL 1731 - POL 19 RYU IS

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED TO AMBASSADOR BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHOI ON APRIL 8 (REFTEL).

2. BEGIN TEXT. ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES MILITARY BASES ON THE RYUKYU ISLANDS HAVE PLAYED AND WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT AND INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REST OF THE FREE ASIAN NATIONS AGAINST ACTS OF AGGRESSION FROM THE COMMUNIST-OCCUPIED NORTH KOREA AND OTHER COMMUNIST REGIMES IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WISHES TO STATE THAT IT HAS DEEP CONCERN OVER THE QUESTION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS PENDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

3. BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AS EVIDENCED BY THE STEPPED-UP PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS BY THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS DURING RECENT YEARS AND THE EVER PRESENT THREATS FROM COMMUNIST REGIMES IN ASIA, THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY BASES ON THE RYUKYU ISLANDS IS EVER INCREASING. THESE BASES ARE ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SECURITY OF JAPAN BUT ALSO FOR THAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE.

(2)

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4-4-69

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 01671 041011Z

21
ACTION EA 15

INFO IO 13,CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,
P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,RSR 01,/094 W
032485

R 040900Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5613
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: OKINAWA

1. ACCORDING PRESS, FOREIGN MIN CHOI TOLD NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE APRIL 3 THAT BASIC GOVERNMENT POSITION ON OKINAWA REVERSION IS THAT IT SHOULD BE HANDLED IN WAY WHICH WILL NOT REDUCE OKINAWA'S STRATEGIC VALUE IN SAFE-GUARDING NEASIA SECURITY. CHOI FURTHER SAID THAT ROKG WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO KEEP OKINAWA'S STRATEGIC VALUE INTACT, ALTHOUGH KOREA DOES NOT INTEND TO INTERVENE IN PROBLEM OF TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY. HE REPORTEDLY ALSO SAID HE WOULD BRING UP ISSUE AT TCC MEETING IN BANGKOK. ~ POL 7 THAI

2. PRESS REPORTED THAT BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION ASSEMBLYMEN, IN THEIR COMMENTS, URGED ROKG TO TAKE STRONG ACTION IN OKINAWA ISSUE. ASSEMBLYMEN, PRESS SAID, ASSERTED THAT REVERSION SHOULD NOT BE SETTLED BETWEEN US AND JAPAN ALONE, BECAUSE OKINAWA BASES ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY OF ALL FREE NATIONS IN NEASIA AS WELL AS US. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT JAPAN SEEKING PRIOR CONSULTATION RIGHTS ON US USE OF BASES AFTER REVERSION.

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3. EXEMPT. PORTER

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46 RS/R FILES

Attention Mrs. Mullett
Keep this study together.
HS.

R/SR

4615

March 28, 1969

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EA

ltr. dated 3/24/69 IS-US
DEF 15 RYU IS-US
XR PEL 19 RYU IS-US

Dear Mr. Olds:

Thank you for your recent letter enclosing a copy of the report of the Okinawa Base Problems Study.

Let me add my congratulations on your new post to those I know you have received from your many friends and colleagues. I am sure that you will find your work interesting and rewarding.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson

U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Glenn A. Olds,
United States Mission to the United Nations,
799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, New York.

J-JCM/bjk

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

YUkon 6-2424

4615

March 24, 1969

The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I am sure you may have received directly a report of the Okinawa Base Problems Study. If not, I enclose a copy with the covering letter from our host for the Kyoto Conference.

Sincerely yours,

Glenn A. Olds

Glenn A. Olds

Enclosure: As stated.

(2)

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XR P&Z 19 RYU JS

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DEF 15 RYU IS - US

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Tokyo 1975 3-047-69

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 01975 141015Z

22
ACTION EA 15

INFO L 03,H 02,JPM 04,AID 28,SS 20,P 04,USIA 12,CAB 09,CIAE 00,[illegible]

DOT 12,E 15,INR 07,NSAE 00,RSC 01,RSR 01,/141 W
035583

R 140840Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO HICOMRY OKINAWA
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5182
DA WASHDC
CINCPAC

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DA FOR ODCSOPS PASS ODUSA (IA)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: OKINAWA: EXPANSION OF NAHA AIRBASE CIVIL AIR FACILITIES

1. IN MARCH 13 LETTER TO ECON/COUNS FROM CHIBA, FONOFF NORTH AMERICA DIVISION, GOJ HAS ACCEPTED LAND RECLAMATION PROJECT AS ONLY PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE FOR EXPANSION NAHA AIRBASE CIVIL AIR FACILITIES.

2. GOJ ACCEPTANCE, HOWEVER, CONTINGENT ON CONDITION THAT "ALL U.S. AUTHORITIES CONCERNED IN OKINAWA" AGREE TO FIVE "POINTS" SET FORTH IN LETTER AND "WILL TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS (FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND THAT ALREADY AGREED EXCEPTED) TO SUPPORT THEM INSOFAR AS SUCH ACTIONS LIE WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE U.S. AUTHORITIES INVOLVED". FIVE POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) LAND RECLAMATION SHALL BE CARRIED OUT AS PART OF OVER-ALL PROGRAM EXPAND CIVIL FACILITIES TO MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR PASSENGERS AND CARGO THRU 1980.

(2) OVERALL PROGRAM SHALL CONSIST OF TWO STAGES, THE FIRST STAGE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS THRU 1975 AND SECOND STAGE FOR 1975-80 PASSENGER/CARGO REQUIREMENTS. (NOTE: MAP ATTACHED TO LETTER DE-

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 01975 141015Z

FINES LAND UTILIZATION FOR EACH STAGE.) CONSTRUCTION WORK ON STAGE TWO WILL COMMENCE UPON COMPLETION OF FIRST STAGE.

(3) FINALIZATION OF OVERALL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, DETERMINATION ADMINISTERING BODY AND RELATED MATTERS SHALL BE SUBJECT FURTHER CONSULTATION AMONG GOJ/GRI/USG.

(4) AREA PRESENTLY UTILIZED FOR CIVIL AIR FACILITIES SHALL CONTINUE BE AVAILABLE FOR CIVIL AIR TRANSPORTATION USE EVEN AFTER COMPLETION OVERALL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

(5) TITLE TO LAND CREATED BY RECLAMATION SHALL BELONG TO GRI.

3. ACCORDING FONOFF, GOJ NOW RELEASING FUNDS FROM OKINAWA AID PROGRAM FOR AIRPORT PROJECT IN ORDER EXPEDITE CONSTRUCTION EVEN THROUGH U.S. HAS NOT YET CONCURRED WITH POINTS SET FORTH ABOVE. HOWEVER, FONOFF HOPES U.S. SIDE CAN AGREE TO CONDITIONS WITHOUT UNDUE DIFFICULTY. GOJ PLANS SUBMIT AIRPORT SURVEY REPORT TO ADCOM AS SOON AS GOJ/USG AGREEMENT FORMALIZED.

4. EMBASSY SENDING LETTER AND MAP ATTACHMENT BY POUCH TO USCAR. FONOFF ASKS WE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TAIPEI
INFO: Amembassy TOKYO
Amembassy SEOUL

STATE

1. Chinese Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, following up on a brief reference to Okinawa in a previous conversation on another matter, called on Mr. Bundy, March 11, on instructions to convey certain GRC views on this subject. Chow noted that GRC has consistently observed with deep interest and concern developments relating to status of Okinawa. He recalled position of GRC, based on Cairo Declaration and subsequent documents, that this matter is subject for consultations among powers concerned, and he reiterated GRC view that any change in status is matter of great concern and on which it hopes USG will consult. Chow also referred to importance US bases to security East Asian and Pacific and stated that any change in this respect would be matter affecting rights and interests of all countries in area.

2. Bundy responded that, without going into discussion of basis of GRC position on consultations, GRC concern to which Chow referred would be met as function of importance which USG attaches to its mutual defense relationship with GRC. He noted that it had been in that spirit that he had mentioned this subject in his previous conversation with Chow, pointing out that US is considering this matter with great urgency and sense of importance and that we

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA/ROC:TPShoesmith:mds 3/11/69	4823	EA - Winthrop G. Brown

Clearances: ~~XXXXXX~~ EA/J - Mr. Finn - draft

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PAGE 01 150704Z

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ACTION SS 10

INFO FILE 01 /011 W 003968

P 150410Z FEB 69
FM HICOMRY OKINAWA RYIS
TO DA
SECSTATE
INFO AMEMB TOKYO
AMEMB BANGKOK
CINCPAC HAWAII
USARPAC HAWAII

DEF 15 RYU-JS-US

S E C R E T EXDIS HC-LN 904401. EXCLUSIVE FOR DUSA(IA) SIENA. STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR FINN. AMEMB TOKYO EXCLUSIVE FOR OSBORN. AMEMB BANGKOK EXCLUSIVE FOR UNGER.
SUBJ: OKINAWA B52'S - GOJ POSTURE
REF: STATE 021587 (NOTAL)
1. (S) THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL UTILITY TO US AND GOJ OF TOGO ADVOCACY OF PUBLIC STATEMENT OF B52 LINK TO VIETNAM WAR IS UNDERSTOOD. HOWEVER, SUCH STATEMENT BY GOJ, ESPECIALLY IF LINKED TO EXPRESS OR TACIT US APPROVAL, WOULD CREATE PROBLEM FOR US HERE AT THIS TIME WITH NO COMPENSATING ADVANTAGE. CONCUR IN POINTS RAISED IN DEP STATE REFTEL.
2. (S) IN WAKE OF EMOTIONAL LET DOWN OF GENERAL STRIKE FAILURE, B52

PAGE 2 RUAOADA1482 S E C R E T
QUESTION HAS SUBSIDED INTO RELATIVE QUIESCENCE. WITH LUCK THIS COULD LAST FOR SOME TIME. ANY NEW OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT BY US OR GOJ, PARTICULARLY ONE ADMITTING DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR, WOULD SURELY BE SEIZED UPON HERE TO REHEAT B52 ISSUE. ANY SUCH OFFICIAL STATEMENT WOULD SETTLE NOTHING AS FAR AS PRESS AND GOVERNMENT HERE ARE CONCERNED, BUT WOULD OPEN DOOR TO HOST OF NEW QUERIES AND PROBES. IT COULD EMBARRASS YARA AND GIVE RADICALS A STICK TO BEAT HIM WITH BECAUSE OF HIS STANCE AGAINST GENERAL STRIKE.
3. (S) WHILE ASSUMPTION THAT B52'S ARE BEING USED IN VIETNAM IS WIDESPREAD, THERE IS UTILITY FOR US AND FOR OUR POLITICAL FRIENDS HERE IN THE REFUGE, HOWEVER FRAIL, AFFORDED BY PUBLIC POSITION THAT WE DO NOT

(1)

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PAGE 02. 150704Z

COMMENT ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS.
4. (S) IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD CONCEIVABLY ARISE WHICH WOULD DICTATE A CHANGE IN OUR PUBLIC POSTURE ALONG TOGO LINE, AND DESIRABLE TO HAVE THIS IN RESERVE FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE. FOR THE PRESENT AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT B52 ISSUE IS BEING HANDLED ADEQUATELY WITH GREAT HELP FROM THE GOJ, AND THAT ANY NEW STATEMENT WOULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. GP-3

[redacted]

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO HICOMRY PRIORITY
DA
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

S E C R E T TOKYO 1208

EXDIS

STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR FINN. DA EXCLUSIVE FOR DUSA (IA) SIENA.
BANGKOK EXCLUSIVE FOR UNGER. HICOMRY EXCLUSIVE FOR LAMPERT.

SUBJECT: OKINAWA B-52'S

REF: A. STATE 21587. B. HCLN 904401

CONCUR PROBABLY SAFEST LEAVE THIS ALONE FOR TIME BEING.
TOGO IS ADMITTEDLY MORE HAWKISH THAN SOME OF HIS POLITICAL
SUPERIORS, AND HE MIGHT WELL BE MISTAKEN IN HIS IMPLICIT
ESTIMATE THAT GOJ SPOKESMEN WOULD STAND UP AND BE COUNTED
IF AUTHORIZED TO SAY WHAT B-52 MISSION IS.

GP-1 OSBORN

(2)

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S/S-O 11		Date February 15, 1969	

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

14 February 1969

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

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

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO
INFO: HICOMRY
Amembassy BANGKOK

STATE
EXDIS
SUBJECT: B-52's in Okinawa

REF: Tokyo 1032 — DEF 15 RYU JS-US XR DEF 12 US

1. Togo a suggestion of GOJ public statement that B-52's engaging in Viet-Nam operations raises serious questions. Would Sato and Aichi be willing to make statement that we would consider adequate, namely to effect that B-52's based in Okinawa are playing important role in operations in Viet-Nam which contribute to security of East Asia and of Japan and that Japan supports these operations? Would not such statement stir up inflammatory reactions in Japan that would be adverse to US interests? Could we not expect hostile press reaction and probably demonstrations? As regards impact in Okinawa, would this not stir up further demonstrations against B-52's and Kadena air base, and possibly weaken moderate political elements?

2. It is not US policy to make or support official statements regarding combat missions such as those of B-52's. Public

Drafted by: RBF
EA/J:RBFinn:idp:vf:2/10/69

Tel. Ext. 6051

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/J ⇔ Richard B. Finn RBF

Clearances:
ODUSA - Mr. Siena
DOD/ISA - Mr. Steadman
EA-Amb. Brown
S/S - JHawley

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Origin XXXXXX Page 2 Amembassy TOKYO, HICOMRY, Amembassy BANGKOK

Info:

statement by GOJ could involve us and GOJ in handling detailed and protracted ~~quest~~ questioning about these ~~ops~~ operations. We would probably not be in position to answer these or ~~assist~~ assist GOJ.

3. Our initial reaction here is that B-52 issue is being handled adequately and that any official statement could well be counter-productive.

~~X~~ 4. Request comments of Embassy Tokyo ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ on above points before we consider this suggestion further.

~~XRX~~

5. Army concurs and requests HICOMRY comments.

GP-4

END.

ROGERS

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 01032 081012Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO /030 W

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 1032

EXDIS

STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR FINNM DA EXCLUSIVE FOR SIENA. HICOMRY EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL LAMPERT. BANGKOK EXCLUSIVE FOR AMB.

SUBJECT: B-52'S IN OKINAWA: GOJ ATTITUDE

1. CHARGE TOOK OCCASION OF CONVERSATION WITH TOGO (CHIEF, AMERICAN BUREAU FONOFF) FEB. 7 TO EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION WITH IMPRESSION CONVEYED BY PRESS REGARDING GOJ ATTITUDE ON B-52'S IN OKINAWA. CHARGE RECALLED USHIBA STATEMENT (TOKYO'S 667) THAT GOJ REALIZED IT HAD NO RIGHT TO ASK US TO WITHDRAW B-52'S FROM OKINAWA AND WAS IN FACT NOT DOING SO. SUBSEQUENTLY, PRESS CONVEYED IMPRESSION THAT YARA HAD BEEN TOLD BY GOJ THAT IT WAS IN FACT SEEKING WITHDRAWAL. CHARGE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO SOME FONOFF OFFICIAL THAT WHILE DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE WAS USED, US HAD BEEN DEFINITELY GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT GOJ WANTS WITHDRAWAL OF B-52'S.

2. WHILE TOGO SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT FONMIN AICHI AND CHIEF CABINET SEC HORI, AT LEAST, HAD SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED SAYING GHAT GOJ HAD REQUESTED OR WAS REQUESTING WITHDRAWAL OF B-52'S, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESS COVERAGE MIGHT QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY HAVE GIVEN RISE TO SOME ANNOYANCE, AND HE EXPRESSED REGRET. TOGO SAID ADMITTEDLY LESS-THAN-SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE ON PART OF GOJ SPOKESMEN DUE IN PART TO DIFFICULT POSITION IN WHICH THEY ARE PLACED BY PROHIBITION AGAINST THEIR GIVING ANY RATIONAL EXPLANATION OF US NEED FOR B-52'S ON OKINAWA. TOGO

(2)

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 01032 081012Z

SAID HE AND OTHER GOU SPOKESMEN, ASSUMED THAT B-52'S WERE BEING USED TO BOMB SOUTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, GOU HAD NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY USG TO TAKE PUBLIC COGNIZANCE OF THIS. IF GOU RECOGNIZES THAT PLANES ARE PLAYING IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THIS WOULD ASSIST GOU IN COUNTERING OPPOSITION ATTACKS, AND HELP IT AVOID DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN WHICH IT APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTING POSITION THAT B-52'S OUGHT LOGICALLY TO BE WITHDRAWN. TOGO EXPRESSED HOPE USG COULD ITSELF ANNOUNCE OR ALLOW GOU TO DISCLOSE PURPOSES FOR WHICH B-52'S BEING USED.

3. COMMENT: A. IT IS IRONIC THAT GOU, WHICH WOULD ONCE HAVE BEEN AVERSE TO MAKING B-52 MISSION PUBLIC, NOW SEES ADVANTAGE IN DOING SO. NEVERTHELESS, TOGO HAS LOGICAL POINT: THAT GOU INABILITY TO SAY WHAT MISSION IS, OR EVEN TO ADMIT KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT MISSION IS, MAKES IT HARD FOR GOU TO INSIST VIS-A-VIS ITS OPPOSITION THAT B-52'S SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE WITHDRAWKN. IF WE WANT TO HAVE GOU QUOTE STAND UP AND BE COUNTED UNQUOTE ON THIS ISSUE, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT WE GIVE THEM THEIR CHANCE TO TAKE A PUBLIC STAND BY PUBLICLY DISCLOSING MISSION OF B-52'S. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, NO GUARANTEE THAT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WILL IN FACT ALIGN ITSELF WITH US ON MERITS OF ISSUE, BUT IT MIGHT BE GOOD IDEA TO PUT GOU TO TEST BY DOING WHAT TOGO SUGGESTS.

B. GOU AND YARA'S OBFUSCATION ABOUT B-52'S ADMITTEDLY RISKS IMPLICIT CREATION OF PRECEDENT WHEREBY GOU MIGHT START HAVING TO RESPOND TO EVERY WIND OF PUBLIC PRESSURE HERE OR IN OKINAWA BY MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO US, WITH END RESULT THAT SO-CALLED QUOTE FREE USE UNQUOTE OF RYUKYUS BASES BECOMES EVEN LESS QUOTE FREE UNQUOTE THAN IT ALREADY IS. EMBASSY BELIEVES GOU (OR AT LEAST FONOFF AND TOP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP) AWARE OF THIS DANGER. WE HAVE DONE EVERY THING WE CAN WITHIN REASON TO MAKE THEM AWARE OF IT. PARTICULARLY IN CASE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER, IT IS PROBABLY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THEM TO STICK, IN FACE OF PRESSURES SUCH AS THOSE GENERATED BY RECENT B-52 STRIKE CRISIS, TO POSITION THAT QUOTE THIS MATTER LIES OUTSIDE OUR PURVIEW UNQUOTE. FOR JAPANESE POLITICIANS, TEMPTATION TO TEMPORIZE BY SAYING, QUOTE YES, WE UNDERSTAND YOUR FEELINGS AND WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET AMERICANS TO LISTEN TO REASON, UNQUOTE IS LIKELY AGAIN TO BECOME OVER-

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 01032 081012Z

WHELMING WHEN NEXT CRISIS ARISES.

C. EMBASSY WILL DO BEST IT CAN TO KEEP THIS COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND, GIVEN OUR BASIC INABILITY TO FORCE POLITICIANS TO KEEP SILENT, AND THE POLITICIANS' BASIC INABILITY TO CONTROL PUBLIC EMOTIONS OR TRENDS OF CONSENSUS. WHILE THIS SITUATION HAS ITS ANNOYING ASPECTS, EMBASSY BELIEVES U.S. HAS WEATHERED THIS B-52 STRIKE CRISIS, IF NOT ENTIRELY UNSCATEHED, AT LEAST ABOUT AS WELL AS WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD CANDIDLY ADMIT THAT SOME OF THE CREDIT IS DUE TO GOJ'S AND YARA'S HANDLING OF ISSUE.
OSBORN

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note - 60

February 3, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes by H.C.D.

Subject: Brinksmanship In The Okinawan Reversion Movement

The threat of a general strike and demonstrations in Okinawa on February 4 does more than pose the danger that traffic to a major US air base may be interdicted for a few hours and that there may be a violent clash between extremist demonstrators and uniformed American military personnel. Unless the strike is called off or scaled down to a formality -- both alternatives appear unlikely -- the strike will prove in public what the US, the GOJ and the Okinawans have known all along: that regardless of treaty rights, the US cannot have "free use" of its Okinawan bases if the population is hostile. That the GOJ felt obliged to respond to the strike threat by even a formal representation to the US on a matter over which it has no jurisdiction (the administration of US bases in Okinawa), and at a time when it reportedly felt such representation might handicap its efforts to persuade the US to return administrative rule of Okinawa to Japan, is an index of rising reversion sentiment in Japan as well as Okinawa. More significantly, the GOJ gesture also showed it could be moved by the threat of violence and Okinawan reversionists can be expected to use this tactic of "brinksmanship" again in their efforts to hasten US-Japanese negotiations on reversion. Responsible Okinawan leaders have in effect accepted the probability of some violence in order to obtain a voice in the reversion negotiations, and are likely to back down only if the violence appears to be uncontrollable and a threat to the reversion negotiations they seek to influence.

DEF 15 RYU JS-US XR POL 19 RYU JS

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The newly exercised Okinawan leverage stems from the fact that both the US and Japan stand to lose from a violent confrontation in Okinawa, particularly if there **are one or more martyrs among the demonstrators. Violence would undermine** the US posture of benevolent rule and reasonableness toward Okinawan (and Japanese) interests and perhaps force the use of martial law. Continuing violence might seriously limit US military capability in Okinawa. The stakes for the Sato government are equally high should violence occur. If a demonstrator were killed, the public reaction in Japan would be strong, and the GOJ would be unable to avoid making a strong representation to the US. There would be an all-out opposition attempt to link the events in Okinawa with the campaign to abrogate the Security Treaty and widespread street demonstrations would take place. These efforts would be reinforced if the opposition were persuasive in describing the situation in Okinawa as one of military occupation, which neither the Japanese nor the Okinawans are in a mood to accept. Such a situation would greatly increase pressures upon the GOJ to hasten the day of reversion and reduce the GOJ's area of flexibility on the terms it might concede to the US.

The general strike and commitant demonstrations have been conceived in an atmosphere of rising expectations that reversion is in sight and extra efforts to hasten it are necessary. In the first public election of Chief Executive of GRI last November, the Okinawans chose Chobyo Yara and his platform of immediate reversion over the OLDP* candidate who followed the GOJ policy of pursuing administrative integration (Ittaika) while leaving reversion for an unspecified date in the future. The statements last November of Mr. Sato's rivals for the LDP*

*** Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party and Liberal Democratic Party of Japan.**

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presidency in favor of reversion with US bases treated on the homeland level encouraged Okinawan reversionists, as have Mr. Sato's own assertions that setting a date for reversion is one of his major goals. Mr. Yara has made it clear that he feels his task is to get the GOJ to negotiate with the US for an increase of local autonomy for the GRI and other meaningful steps toward reversion. In this context he has been critical of the US-GOJ-GRI Advisory Committee to promote Ittaika, and has so far -- unsuccessfully -- tried to augment its role to encompass "political issues" like the stationing of B-52s and SSN visits.

Strike Plans. When the Joint Struggle Council of the Council to Protect the Lives of Okinawans (JSC) set the date for the strike in early January, about 9,000 were expected to participate in dawn to dusk picket lines and sit-downs at three gates of Kadena Air Base and at other sit-downs starting at 5 p.m., blocking traffic on arterial highways. Police estimates 10 days before the strike date forecast 20,000 people would be demonstrating throughout Okinawa. If the latest plans materialize, the US Civil Administration (USCAR) expects schools, public transportation and private industries to be shut down, and public utilities to operate with reduced staff. The increased participation in demonstrations is in part explained by the decision of the Military Workers Union (Zengunro) and the Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA) to participate in the strike. Both decisions were made after and without doubt influenced by the unexpected announcement of the new Comprehensive Labor Ordinance (CLO) on January 11. At present the strike and demonstrations can be expected to stop traffic for a few hours, interdict several gates to Kadena, and to suggest convincingly that future demonstrations could result in interdiction for longer periods of time. If Zengunro members

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actually take "leave of absence" on February 4, US military personnel will have to assume the base security role. They will be separated from demonstrators by at most 1,200 GRI policemen and the possibility of a violent clash, particularly between students and extreme left wing elements, cannot be dismissed, even though strike leaders say they wish to avoid violence.

The Objects of the Strike. The dramatic crash of a B-52 on November 19 of last year focused the widespread resentment of the noise and danger of bomb-laden B-52s and provided the principal reason for the general strike. All political groups in Okinawa are on record as opposing the stationing of B-52s. To this issue the strike sponsors have added opposition to SSN visits because of alleged danger of radioactivity, an issue which draws less public interest than the B-52s but concerning which it is politically difficult, if not impossible, to be "reasonable". The SSN issue could become red-hot if SSN visits occur during periods of high excitment over other issues. It is noteworthy that Yara has advocated that the GOJ join the US-GRI radiation monitoring system, indicating his desire for greater GOJ involvement in the Okinawa political scene. The unexpected announcement on January 11 that a new CLO would become effective two weeks later added a third issue to the general strike. Provisions restricting picketing and the political activities of labor unions were widely interrupted in Japan and Okinawa as an attempt to suppress the February 4 strike and active participation by Zengunro and OTA in the strike became a foregone conclusion. Subsequent suspension of the effective date while USCAR considers written objections to the CLO might take some steam out of union participation in the strike but it will

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only delay a showdown -- including use of the strike threat -- when the CLO eventually takes effect. The CLO controversy has become a vehicle for the Okinawan's desire to increase their say over local affairs, including base nuisances. Even the OLDP opposes the new CLO and political leaders across the board are urging recission and replacement of CLO with a law passed by the GRI legislature.

There is widespread support for the immediate and ultimate objects of the strike: the immediate objects of opposition to the B-52s, SSN visits and the new Comprehensive Labor Ordinance, and the ultimate objects of an increase in local autonomy and the hastening of reversion. None of these issues are likely to disappear in the next few months. Okinawan political parties have played a secondary role in the leadership and organization of the strike and demonstrations, which are billed as a reversion effort cutting across the political spectrum. The JSC consists of 139 organizations, including groups as diverse as labor unions, students, Soka Gakkai and mayor's associations. It is led by the Prefectural Labor Federation (Kenryokyo)Chairman Kokichi Kameko, a militant and charismatic trade unionist. Kenryokyo, OTA and Zengunro compose a significant portion of political power in Okinawa, and all have factions which favor the use of strikes and demonstrations in pursuit of the above goals. If, as appears to be the case, the rank and file strongly support the goals of the February 4 program, significant modification of strike and demonstration plans might cause serious problems for the leadership of these organizations. Although both CE Yara and the strike leaders are apparently sincerely concerned about the possibility of violence, and are making eleventh-hour efforts to call off the strike (but not the

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demonstrations), they have made it clear from the start that unless the GOJ gave creditable assurances that it would enter into negotiations with US which would lead to removal of the B-52s soon, the strike would not be called off. The GOJ pro-forma representation to the US on January 29 (it hoped that the conditions for removal of the B-52s would be realized soon) hardly meets Yara's criteria. It seems unlikely that February 4 will pass without significant demonstrations and some strike activity, and it seems quite likely that a precedent for similar actions will be set.

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

INFO: HICOMRY Naha
CINCPAC

SUBJECT: OKINAWA - B-52s

~~XXXX~~

Following are pertinent excerpts frm Department's daily news briefing of January 29, 1969 re B-52s in Okinawa:

QUESTION: /~~Xxxx~~Bob, do you have any information on the possibility of the United States withdrawing B-52s from Okinawa?

ANSWER: No, sir, I have no information on that. (FYI: DOD has also ~~xx~~ received press inquiries re possibility of B-52s ~~XXXXX~~ being withdrawn and has responded Quote: we of course do not comment on future operational matters Unquote.

END

ROGERS

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Tokyo 632
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 00632 271602Z

45
ACTION EA 15

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,ABCE 00,ACDA 16,MC 01,CIAE 00,
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 632

SUBJ: OKINAWA - B-52'S: FONOFF DEMARCHE OUTLINED

1. CHIBA (FONOFF NORTH AMERICA DIVISION CHIEF) CALLED IN POL COUNSELOR LATE JAN 27 TO ADVISE HIM OF APPROACH TO CHARGE WHICH FONOFF WILL MAKE JAN 28. CHIBA SAID RECENT EVENTS HAVE PUT GOJ ONSPOT WHERE FONOFF HAD DECIDED IT MUST DO SOMETHING TO IMPROVE GOJ POSITION IN FACE OF HEAVY POLITICAL PRESSURES DEVELOPING HERE AND IN OKINAWA.

2. VECHIBA SAID RYUKYUS CHIEF EXECUTIVE YARAN STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY OPPOSITION PARTIES IN JAPAN, WAS DEMANDING THAT GOJ ASSIST HIM IN ATTEMPTING REDUCE SCOPE OF FEB. 4 GENERAL STRIKE BY ASSURING HIM OF ITS DETERMINATION TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH USG ON WITHDRAWAL OF B-52'S FROM OKINAWA. CHIBA SAID FONOFF OF COURSE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. WAS ON FIRM LEGAL GROUNDS IN OPERATING B-52'S FROM OKINAWA BASES AND FULLY REALIZED THAT INTEMPERATE DEMARCHE BY GOJ MIGHT CREATE CONDITIONS NOT REPEAT NOT CONDUCIVE TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON OKINAWA. FONOFF FELT, HOWEVER, THAT IT MUST DO SOMETHING TO HELP YARA HANDLE STRIKE PROBLEM AND TO PROTECT GOJ FROM CHARGES IN DIET THAT IT HAD DONE NOTHING TO PREVENT STRIKE.

3. SPEAKING "WITH AUTHORITY OF MINISTER", CHIBA OUTLINED FOLLOW-

(3)

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29

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